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ARTICLES

A PRIMER ON THE TAXATION OF
EXECUTIVE DEFERRED COMPENSATION
PLANS
KATHRYN

J.

KENNEDY*

ABSTRACT

The Enron scandal has piqued Congress' interest regarding
the particulars of executive deferred compensation plans. While
Enron's rank-and-file employees, participating in the company's
qualified profit sharing plan, watched their life savings plummet
in value as the company stock collapsed, Enron executives were
selling off their company stock, receiving bonuses, and making
withdrawals from their executive compensation plans. With
respect to these executive deferred compensation plans, how could
these insider Enron executives withdraw massive amounts of
deferred compensation in advance of their company's bankruptcy,
draining the employer's assets from its creditors? What were the
provisions of these executive compensation plans? Were the
particulars of these plans readily available to Enron's
shareholders and employees, and to the public at large? The
answers to these questions were not readily available when
Congress inquired, which obviously caused even greater concerns.
A variety of legislative proposals have been discussed ranging
from corporate governance to tax law changes.
The author was asked to testify before the Senate Finance
committee in April 2002 on the tax aspects of executive deferred
compensation plans, inquiring how such plans are designed to
avoid current taxation for its participants. By late June 2002, the
Democrats in Congress initiated new "corporate governance"
legislation that proposed to alter the taxation of executive
* Kathryn J. Kennedy is an associate professor of law at The John

Marshall Law School, specializing in tax and employee benefits law. She is
the director of the graduate tax law program and the graduate employee
benefits program. Special thanks to my research assistants Christopher
Condeluci, Cynthia Hubbard, and Kyle Murray for their excellent assistance.
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compensation plans, but only for those plans funded with employer
stock. While the Enron executives clearly held company stock that
was sold in advance of the company's bankruptcy, it is not clear
whether their executive deferred compensation plans used
employer stock as the basis for payment. The Senate Finance
Committee proposed legislation in mid-July, tightening the tax
rules applicable to executive compensation plans in an effort to
prevent future Enron-type scandals. This article is a by-product of
the oral and written testimony provided by the author to the
Senate Finance Committee in April. It is intended to summarize
the existing tax rules applicable to these plans and to recommend
whether tax legislation post-Enron is warranted or appropriate.
Certainly corporate governance initiatives should be encouraged
as a result of Enron; however, the author questions relying on the
federal tax code to cure Enron's woes is the best avenue.
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code' implicitly recognizes that it is the
employer who determines the level and timing of an employee's
compensation, whether this refers to current or deferred
compensation. To the extent that a portion of that compensation is
deemed "excessive," the Code may deny the employer's deduction.
Corporate employers have legitimate business reasons for favoring
the payment of deferred compensation to executives, in lieu of
paying all compensation as current cash compensation. While the
majority of rank-and-file employees would shudder at the idea of
deferring a significant portion of their current compensation to a
subsequent year, especially if the payment was further contingent
upon subsequent job performance or forfeited upon subsequent
employment with a competitor, it is common practice for
employers to condition some executive deferred compensation
upon such criteria. Such practices actually benefit the employer
and its shareholders, by making the executive's compensation
conditioned upon performance and forfeitable if the executive
leaves the employer and works for a competitor. Although such
arrangements may be negotiated individually between the
executive and the employer under an individual employment
agreement, deferred compensation arrangements made available
to a select group of executives are considered employee benefit
plans, and therefore subject to the rules of the Employees
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
ERISA was passed to impose substantive and regulatory rules
to protect employees covered under various deferred compensation

1. The Internal Revenue Code, 29 U.S.C., may be referred to as the "Code"
in the text and may appear abbreviated as I.R.C.
2. This act may be referred to as ERISA in the text.
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and fringe benefit plans; however various statutory and
administrative exemptions were provided for executive deferred
compensation plans, prefaced with the understanding that such
executives were not in need of legislative protections.3 As a result,
there are no substantive regulations under ERISA regarding
executive deferred compensation plans; and, this accounts for the
wide variety in the types of executive compensation plans that are
being used.
In contrast, qualified retirement and profit sharing plans that
are available to the rank-and-file employees are regulated by
ERISA and the Code. Such plans must limit the maximum amount
of benefits or annual deferrals that may be accumulated, thereby
necessitating the establishment of nonqualified retirement or
profit sharing plans for executives if comparable replacement
income is to be provided. In addition, as ERISA's and the Code's
vesting schedules do not permit an employer to "handcuff' an
employee for a significant period of time, executive deferred
compensation plans may seek to impose a wide variety of "golden
handcuff' provisions to limit the payment of the deferred
compensation. The cumulative legislative changes in the
maximum levels of benefits/deferrals under qualified plans, the
statutory vesting
schedules,
and
the more
restrictive
nondiscrimination tests imposed on qualified retirement or profit
sharing plans have resulted in greater pressure on employers to
adopt a variety of executive deferred compensation plans. Such
4
growth has increased exponentially in the past twenty years.
Recent popular press has decried the popularity of executive
deferred compensation plans, pointing to the limitations on
qualified plans under the tax code as the main culprit for
promoting such plans.5 The reality is that the tax code rules have
taken a more reactive approach to the design and implementation
of executive compensation plans, rather than a proactive stance.
Some of this is historic, other is due to the I.R.S. Service's (the
"Service") delay in promulgating rules to prevent tax abuses.

3. Pub. L. No. 93-406, §§ 4 (b)(5), 201(2), 301(a)(3), 401(a)(1), 88 Stat. 29
(1974); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(5) (2000), 1051(2) (2000), 1081(a)(3) (2000),
1101(a)(1) (2000).
4. See K.C. Swanson, Elite Retirement Plans Are Expanding, (April 16,
2002) (referring to William MacDonald's assertion that executive deferred
compensation plans have increased in use by the Fortune 1000 firms from 10%
in the 1980s to more than 86% in 2001) at http://www.thestreet.coml
funds/belowradar/10017460.html.
See also Clark/Bardes ConsultingCompensation Resource Group, 2001 Survey of Executive Compensation Plans

(referring for a summary of its 2001 survey of more than 20% of the Fortune
1000 companies regarding their executive deferred compensation plans),
available at

http://www.crgworld.com/publications/2001_benefit-survey.pdf

(last visited Sept. 5 2002).
5. See infra note 23.
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However, an employer's deductions for an executive's current and
deferred compensation have always been subject to a
reasonableness standard; thus if the compensation is deemed
excessive and unreasonable, that excessive portion is denied a
deduction.' In an effort to curb the payment of excessive severance
benefits, Congress reacted in the 1980s by amending the Code to
deny employer deductions for "excess parachute payments"
(defined as severance payments paid as a result of a change in
ownership or effective control that were in excess of a given base
amount).' Congress also imposed a 20% excise tax on executives
who were in receipt of such excess parachute payments.8 Similarly,
in an effort to dissuade excessive compensation packages,
Congress reacted in the 1990s by disallowing employer deductions
for certain executive compensation payments that exceeded
$1,000,000. 9 Neither legislative efforts have curtailed the sharp
increase in executive bonuses and deferred compensation plans, as
was the case in the Enron scandal."° Thus, one questions whether
the Code is the proper vehicle for curtailing the use and growth of
executive deferred compensation plans. Weeding out corporate
greed may require more attention to the root of the problem,
rather than bemoaning its fruits.
Current Relevance
ERISA's legislative and regulatory exemptions for executive
deferred compensation plans provide employers with great
flexibility as to individually designed plans without regard to
ERISA's eligibility, vesting, distributions, and discrimination
rules. Such exemptions were initially intended to limit an
executive's substantive rights; however, in the context of the
6. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2000) (permitting a deduction for "a reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered") and Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-l(b) (2002) (stating that "[iun order to be
deductible under section 404(a), contributions must be expenses which would
be deductible under section 162" and denying a deduction for amounts in
excess of a "reasonable allowance for compensation for the services actually
rendered"). Those latter regulations were last amended in 1963 when I.R.C. §
404(a)(5) specifically referred to I.R.C. § 162 in determining whether an
expense for deferred compensation would be allowable. While the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1851(b)(2)(C)(i)) removed the reference of
I.R.C. § 162 from § 404(a)(5), the legislative history indicates Congress'
intention to broaden § 404(a)(5) to refer to all forms of compensation.
Albertson's Inc. v. Comm'r, 42 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1994).
7. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 § 67(a) (1984), (adding § 280G to
the Internal Revenue Code).
8. See id. § 67(b) (1984) (adding § 4999 to the Internal Revenue Code).
9. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, § 13211(a) (1993) (adding
subparagraph (m) to § 162 to the Internal Revenue Code which excepted
performance-based compensation from this rule).
10. See supra note 4.
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Enron bankruptcy, ERISA's exclusion may have afforded greater
protections to the executives than available to the rank-and-file
employees.
In the Enron case, many of the employees covered under the
employer's qualified profit sharing plan lost their entire life
savings as their designated investment of employer stock
plummeted in value." During this same time period, insider
executives received enormous bonuses" and withdrew benefits
from their executive deferred compensation plans."
Such
withdrawals would have certainly drained cash from the employer,
monies that would have otherwise been available to the rank-andfile as damages in subsequent lawsuits against the employer.
Obviously that result is in direct conflict with the premise of
ERISA to protect the rights of the covered participants and
beneficiaries. 4

11. See Enron Pension and Benefit Issues: Hearings of the House
Education and Workforce Committee [hereinafter "Enron Pension & Benefits
Hearings"], 109th Cong. (Feb. 7, 2002) (excerpts from testimony from Rep.

John A. Boehner, Committee Chair, "[o]n December 2, 2001, the Enron
Corporation filed the largest bankruptcy petition in U.S. history. The next
day, the company announced that it would lay off 4,000 of its 7,500 employees
as part of a corporate restructuring program. The devastating losses in the
company's employee 401(k) plan left many loyal Enron employees without
their retirement security. The stories told by Enron's employees are heartwrenching. The Enron collapse has sent chills down the spine of every
American employee who has worked and saved for a safe, secure retirement").
See also The Gottesdiener Law Firm, Enron 401k Plan Lawsuit (last visited
Sept. 5 2002) (alleging in the class action complaint against Enron
Corporation that the participants lost retirement savings of approximately $1
billion as a result of the Enron defendants who were plan fiduciaries), at
http://www.enronsuit.com.
12. See Eric Berger, $680 Million Paid to Top Enron Execs in '01,
HOUSTON CHRON. June 17, 2002, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/
story.hts/special/enron1457323 (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
13. See Enron Pension & Benefits Hearings, supra note 11 (responding to
inquiries from Rep. Culberson as to whether withdrawals were made from the
rabbi trust pursuant to the deferred compensation plans to executives during
the blackout period in which rank-and-file Enron employees could not
withdraw their monies, Mr. Scott Peterson from Hewitt, the deferred
compensation plan's recordkeeper, stated "[w]e were informed about certain
accounts that in fact had been cashed out"). See also Eric Berger, Deferred
Payments Under Fire, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 16, 2002, (stating that Enron
paid cash compensation from deferred compensation plans worth at least $32
million in October and November, 2000 to Enron executives who were still
working for the company), available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/
story.hts/speciaIenron/1538191 (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
14. See Senate Finance Committee's Report on S. REP. NO. 1179 (Aug. 21,
1973) (noting the fiduciary responsibility provisions) (showing that the
fiduciary's rule "which prohibits a fiduciary from jeopardizing the income or
assets of a plan, fiduciaries will be subject to the usual trustees' duties such as
(but not limited to) the duty to keep and render clear and accurate accounts,
take and keep control of the plan property, protect the plan property from loss
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While the Enron scandal may be the impetus for any
subsequent legislation, any proposed legislation should also be
reviewed in the context of the more typical employer context executives that are not in control of the company's financial
statements or of their accountants but are otherwise at risk from
the employer's subsequent decision not to pay benefits pursuant to
the plan. This article will describe what regulatory authority the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Department of Labor
(DOL) presently have to impose more rigorous rules on executive
compensation plans, and whether additional legislation would be
needed, as a result of the Enron scandal. Hopefully, the aftermath
of Enron may cause the regulatory authorities to promote more
rigorous requirements for executive compensation plans, especially
in the context of executives who are insiders (as defined by the
securities laws). 5 Such requirements would be welcome additions
to protect the rank-and-file employees who may now find
themselves in the position of unsecured creditors in lawsuits
against their employer.
If Congress finds it necessary to legislate in this area, the
author suggests that simply lifting the moratorium on the IRS's
ability to issue certain types of guidance may be sufficient to
empower the Service to make appropriate regulatory changes.
Additional changes to the Code are not the proper vehicle for
regulating all the particulars of executive deferred executive
compensation plans. Greater disclosure of such plans by publicly
held employers would certainly permit their shareholders and the
public to monitor the level and particulars of such plans.
What Are Nonqualified Executive CompensationPlans?
Nonqualified executive compensation plans may be best
understood by explaining what they are not. They are not
qualified retirement or profit sharing plans (i.e., plans that satisfy
the requirements of I.R.C. section 401(a)).
The terms
"nonqualified executive deferred compensation plan" does not
appear in either the Code or ERISA, but is used by practitioners to
refer to executive compensation plans that defer payment of
benefits - usually until termination of employment, disability or
retirement - which are not intended to be qualified under I.R.C.
section 401(a).
Qualified plans must satisfy nondiscrimination rules to
and damage, enforce claims of the plan and defend actions against the plan...
and keep plan assets separate from other property."). See aAlso Jennifer A.
Leahy, 34 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 595, n.4 & 5 (2001) (referencing, ERISA's
legislative history under H. REP. NO. 93-533, at pt. 11 (1973)).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 8(p) (2000) (defining an insider as any officer,

director or beneficial owner of more than ten percent of a class of registered
securities).
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assure that highly paid employees are not treated more favorably
with respect to benefits and coverage than the rank-and-file
employees.16 In addition, there are maximum limitations on
benefits and deferrals on behalf of a given employee, both in the
form of a cap on annual compensation and a cap on the dollar and
percentage limits on benefits and deferrals. 17 Funding and
fiduciary rules assure that the assets set aside for these plans are
maintained for the exclusive benefit of the participants and
beneficiaries," and invested prudently by plan fiduciaries. 9 Such
assets are protected from the employer's creditors in the event of
bankruptcy or insolvency.
In addition to these substantive
protections, the Code also protects the employees from taxation
until the time of actual distribution from the plan. There are
legitimate policy reasons for providing such a tax subsidy for
qualified retirement plans. Savings for retirement is promoted,
and employees are able to retire with sufficient retirement income.
It is possible that the improved general welfare actually
strengthens the tax base while reducing pressures on the
governmental safety net (e.g., Social Security). In providing such
tax exceptions for qualified plans, the Code implicitly
acknowledges that the typical rank-and-file employee, who has
already rendered services, would not be willing to have the
employer defer such payment unless there was a vested and
secured right to receive such benefits in the future. Code section
401(k) provides an additional opportunity for the employee to defer
his/her actual current compensation for subsequent payment
without any adverse tax consequences, subject to the requirements
of that section. ° Given the maximum dollar limitations provided
16. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (2000) (prohibiting nondiscrimination as to highly
compensated employees, who are 5% shareholders of the employer or
employees earning compensation in excess of $80,000 (indexed)).

17. See I.R.C. §§ 415(b) & 415(c) (2000) (providing maximum dollar and
percentage limitations applicable to benefits under defined benefit plans and
deferrals under defined contribution plans) and I.R.C. § 401(a)(17) (2000)
(providing an annual dollar cap on the amount of an individual's compensation

that may be considered for benefit or deferral purposes).
18. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (2000) (providing for a tax-exempt trust for
contributions made to a plan qualified under I.R.C. § 401(a)); I.R.C. § 401(a)(2)

(2000) (prohibiting the trust to divert any part of its corpus or income other
than for the exclusive benefit of the participants and beneficiaries), 26 I.R.C.
§§ 403(a), 404(a) (2000); see also ERISA § 403(a) (2000) (requiring that plan
assets be held in trust); see also ERISA § 404(a) (requiring the plan fiduciaries

to discharge their duties solely in the interest of participants and
beneficiaries).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000) (corresponds to ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B))

(mandating the plan fiduciary to discharge his/her duties "with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would

use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.").
20. 26 I.R.C. § 401(k) (2000) (permitting a maximum deferral for 2002 of
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to the qualified plan, the annual dollar limits applicable to Code
section 401(k) deferrals2' and the maximum dollar limitation
imposed on an employee's annual compensation for purposes of the
qualified plan,2 executives and employers seek additional ways to
defer current and supplemental compensation.
Nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements cannot
rely upon the Code's preferential tax treatment. Such
arrangements are generally agreements between the employer and
its executives to defer a portion of the executive's presently-earned
compensation to a subsequent year or to provide supplemental
deferral compensation. These agreements may range from single
employment contracts between an executive and the employer to
plans covering numerous executives of the employer. The latter
agreements are coined "executive deferred compensation" plans as
the payment for the current services is deferred to the future
without the kind of guarantees and security afforded to
participants under qualified plans. In addition to having the
deferral be non-vested and unsecured for tax reasons, the benefits
themselves may be contingent upon future performance or
forfeited upon the occurrence of certain events (e.g., subsequent
employment with a competitor).
In a series of articles in The New York Times six years ago,
executive compensation plans were highly criticized and described
as providing tax loopholes for executives to amass large fortunes of
deferred compensation from their employers to the detriment of
rank-and-file employees and shareholders." The Enron scandal
has piqued interest again in executive compensation plans as
many Enron executives have withdrawn monies from these plans
prior to the Enron collapse, while many participants in the Enron
qualified section 401(k) plan were unable to withdraw
contributions invested in employer stock and lost their entire life
savings as the company stock collapsed. 4
$11,000; and increasing by $1,000 annual increments due to cost of living
adjustments until it hits $15,000 in 2006, with annual cost of living
adjustments then limited to annual $500 increments).

21. See I.R.C. § 415 (providing for maximum dollar and percentage
limitations for qualified defined benefit plans and qualified defined
contribution plans) and I.R.C. § 402(g) (providing for a maximum dollar limit
for deferrals made pursuant to a section 401(k) plan).
22. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(17) (2000) (providing an annual exclusion for

compensation in excess of $160,000, as adjusted for cost of living changes).
23. Christopher Drew & David Cay Johnston, Rushing Away from Taxes:
For the Wealthy, Death is More Certain than Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1996

at A1,; Diana B. Henriques and David Cay Johnston, Managers Staying Dry
as CorporationsSink, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1996 at Al; Diana B. Henriques
and Floyd Norris, Rushing Away From Taxes: The Capital Gains Bypass, N.Y.*'

TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996 at Al; Melody Petersen, Deferred Compensation for the.
Masses: A Plum at a Price, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1996 § 3,

at 10.

24. See supra notes 11 and 13. See also Dan Feldstein & Eric Berger,
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Legitimate concerns have arisen in Congress 'as to how and
when executives are permitted to withdraw funds from executive
compensation plans, especially in advance of the employer's
bankruptcy. The Senate Finance Committee held hearings in the
Spring of 2002 regarding corporate governance and executive
compensation plans in light of the Enron demise." By summer,
the Democrats initiated a "corporate governance" proposal
subjecting executives to immediate taxation under certain
deferred compensation plans that were funded with employer
stock and assessing a golden parachute excise tax if the plan was
designed to protect those benefits in the event of employer
bankruptcy or financial distress.2 ' The Senate Finance Committee
also has proposed legislative changes to curb abuses under
executive compensation plans.27
In the foregoing context, the purpose of this primer is to
examine how executive compensation plans are taxed and to
highlight legitimate concerns that Congress may wish to address.
The primer is limited to private sector corporations' executive
compensation plans, which are funded neither by employer stock
(or stock options) nor split dollar life insurance. Those latter issues
warrant a separate article due to their complexities.
General Tax Rules
The Code adopts a general "matching" rule for deferred
compensation payable to an employee-the employer receives a
deduction on deferred compensation when the executive takes the
deferral into income.' The Internal Revenue Code provides an
Enron's Retired Get Burned, Too, HOUSTON CHRON. Feb. 16 2002 available at

http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/enron/1258396
(last visited
Sept. 5, 2002); The Gottesdiener Law Firm, Enron 401k Plan Lawsuit (last
visited Sept. 5 2002) (reporting of losses of over $1 billion by participants
under the Enron § 401(k) plan due to the decline in the value of employer
stock), at http://www.enronsuit.com.
25. See generally the list of witness testimonies for the hearing on
Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation, held on April 18, 2002,
before the Senate Finance Committee at http://www.finance.senate.gov/
sitepages/hearing 041802.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
26. See www.house.gov/rules/matsui_036.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2002)

(subjecting performance-based compensation to the $1,000,000 deductibility
ceiling; denying a tax deferral for corporate insiders with executive
compensation plans funded with employer stock; applying the golden
parachute excise tax to deferral compensation plans if there is a major decline
in the company's stock or bankruptcy).
27. Description of Chairman's Modifications to the "National Employee
Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act," THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAx'N,

July 11, 2002, availableat http://www.house.gov/jct/x-74-02.pdf.
28. I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (2000). This is known as the "matching rule"
whereby the employer's deduction must match the employee's inclusion of
such amounts as taxable income for the same tax year. See also Albertson's,
Inc., 42 F.3d at 541 (noting that interest and earnings on compensation
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exception to the general income tax rule such that an employee
who receives a vested and funded right to receive deferred
compensation under a qualified pension or profit sharing plans
does not incur any current income tax consequences.2 9 In addition,
the employer who makes a contribution for the benefit of the
employee receives a current deduction for such contributions to the
underlying trust." Thus, Congress provides a substantial tax
subsidy for deferrals made under qualified retirement plans, both
for the employer and the covered employees. Code section 401(k)
provides an additional tax shelter whereby employees may
contribute pre-tax contributions to a qualified profit sharing plan,
delaying any tax on the contributions and the earned income until
actual distribution from the trust. For deferred compensation
plans that are not qualified under I.R.C. section 401(a), the
employer deductibility rules of I.R.C. section 162 and the employee
income tax rules of I.R.C. section 61 are applicable to any deferrals
of compensation.3'
For compensation deferrals under nonqualified plans, it may
appear that the IRS is losing tax revenue because the employee is
not presently taxed on such deferral. However, since the deferral is
nonqualified, monies remain with the employer (until future
distribution) and are taxed presently at the corporate tax rates. As
the compensation accrues with interest but remains deferred, any
earnings that the employer generates on the retained
compensation is also taxable to the employer.32
The employee's taxation of such deferrals, if properly
structured under an executive deferred compensation, is deferred
until the actual receipt of the payments. During this time span,
the deferrals must be unavailable, or if available, subject to
substantial risk of loss or forfeiture.33 To do otherwise will subject
deferred under deferred compensation plans were also subject to the I.R.C. §
404(a)(5) matching rule).
29. See I.R.C. § 402(b) (2000), (subjecting the participant to tax when such
amounts are actually distributed from the qualified plan).
30. I.R.C. § 404 (2000).
31. See I.R.C. § 162 (2000) (describing normal "ordinary and necessary"

business expense rules regarding the employer's deduction for employee
compensation).

See also I.R.C. § 280G (2000) (describing imposition of a

maximum limit on excess parachute payments that provide additional
compensation to executives in the event of a "change of control" of the
employer either through merger or acquisition).
32. See Albertson's, Inc. 42 F.3d at 541; see also 95 T.C. 415 (1990)

(reversing its earlier decision and agreeing with the Tax Court's conclusion
that a current deduction for an employer for the interest/earnings component
of a nonqualified deferred compensation plan would be contrary to the intent
of I.R.C. § 404(a)(5)).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (2002).

[Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is
constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is
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the employee to immediate taxation although actual receipt is
delayed.
Thus, there is no massive tax loophole afforded by such
nonqualified executive compensation arrangements. The IRS is
receiving tax presently at the corporate level on these deferrals
and on their earnings; taxation of the deferrals at the employee
level is delayed until actual payment or until the substantial risk
lapses. Indeed, the future taxability of the employee is offset by
future deductibility to the corporation-approximately a "wash."
The IRS receives its tax now, not later.
If there are no tax advantages, why do we have these
executive deferred compensation plans? There are legitimate
reasons why such plans are popular:
* For the executive, such plans may provide for the gap at
retirement between the level that can be provided under the
qualified retirement plan and the replacement income level
that is desired. As Congress continues to impose limitations
on deferrals under qualified plans (through compensation
limits and maximum benefit/deferrals limits),' more pressure
is certainly created to supplement the executive's retirement
benefit. These nonqualified arrangements also provide
flexibility by permitting the executive to alter the timing of
the receipt of such compensation and allowing the
corporation continued use of the employee's compensation
during the period of deferral.
* For the corporation, an executive deferred compensation
plan permits the amount of the executive's compensation to
be dependent on future performance; may be used as a
retention device thereby providing for forfeitures for earlier
departure or subsequent employment with a competitor
(referred to as "golden handcuffs"); may be used as a
recruitment device to hire mid-career executives who
otherwise will lose benefits under their existing employer
plans; and can be a useful early retirement tool in retiring
executives. Qualified plans cannot achieve these objectives as
vesting schedules are mandated by the Code and
future
upon
be
dependent
cannot
compensation
performance.35 In addition, executive deferred compensation
credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available
so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could have
drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention to withdraw
had been given. However, income is not constructively received if the
taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or
restrictions.
Id.
34. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(17) and 415 (2000) (imposing compensation

ceilings and maximum benefit/contribution ceilings for qualified defined
benefit and defined contribution plans).
35. See I.R.C. § 411(a) (2000) (setting forth the appropriate vesting
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plans involve less operational costs due to ERISA's simplified
reporting requirements. 3' The flexibility afforded in the
design and administration of executive compensation plans
make them very attractive to employers.
0 There exists a modest tax arbitrage between the top
corporate rate of 36% and the top individual rate of 39.1%.
So the tax code embodies a slim incentive to have income
taxed sooner at the corporate rate, and later at the individual
rate.

In order for the executive to delay taxation of deferrals under
executive compensation plans, certain tax rules must be satisfied.37
These rules are set forth in the Internal Revenue Code or
regulations, and have been interpreted by the Service and the
courts. The Service's application of some of these rules, especially
regarding the executive's ability to alter the payment scheme, has
been regarded as unduly restrictive,' whereas the courts provide

schedules that may be used in a qualified plan); see I.R.C. § 414(s) (2000)
(providing definitions of "compensation" for qualified plan purposes that do not
include nonqualified deferred compensation).
36. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-23 (2001) (requiring only a filing with the
Secretary of Labor within 120 days of the plan's adoption of basic
information-such as the name and address of the employer, a declaration
that the employer maintains the plan for a select group of highly compensated
employees, and a statement regarding the number of such plans and the
number of employees in each. While the plan document need not be filed, it
must be provided if requested by the Secretary).
37. These tax rules are: 1) the constructive receipt doctrine (set forth in
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a)); 2) the economic benefit doctrine (Gen. Couns. Mem.
35196 (Jan. 16, 1973); 3) § 83 requirements regarding property transferred to
an individual in connection with the performance of services (Treas. Reg. §
1.83-3(e)); and, 4) the vested accrued benefit rule (I.R.C. § 402(b), 26 U.S.C. §
402(b) (2000)).
38. In 1978, the Service attempted to reverse its prior constructive receipt
rules, through the issuance of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16 (stating "if ...
payment of an amount of a taxpayer's basic or regular compensation... (or
supplements to such compensation, such as bonuses or increases in such
compensation) is, at the taxpayer's individual option, deferred to a taxable
year later than that in which such amount would have been payable but for
her exercise of such option, the amount shall be treated as received by the
taxpayer in such earlier taxable year. For purposes of this paragraph, it is
immaterial that the taxpayer's right in the amount payment of which is so
deferred become forfeitable by reason of his exercise of the option to defer
payment."). Congress reacted by passing § 132 of Pub. L. No. 95-600 (the
Revenue Act of 1978), which provided that the tax treatment of private
deferred compensation plans would be determined in accordance with
principles set forth in regulations, rulings and case law which were in effect
February 1, 1978. For an excellent discussion of the differences in opinions
between the Internal Revenue Service and Congress see Richard S. Fischer,
Deferred Compensation: Born Again - For Now, 37 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 210, 210-86 (1979).
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greater latitude in extending the payment provisions.39 Given the
courts' more liberal interpretation, it is understandable that the
Service has not been actively litigating in this area. Congress may
wish to give the Service more regulatory power if it feels the
courts' interpretations are too lenient.
General ERISA Rules
ERISA regulates all employee benefit plans, including
retirement/profit sharing and welfare benefit plans, unless such
plans are exempt. For retirement and profit sharing plans, there
are substantive requirements relating to eligibility, vesting,
participation, funding, and distribution of benefits. There are also
reporting and disclosure requirements and fiduciary rules. An
executive deferred compensation plan must fall within one of the
exemptions provided under ERISA in order to ignore its
requirements.
An executive deferred compensation plan that is an unfunded
"excess benefit" plan is totally exempt from all of ERISA's
substantive and procedural requirements.40 However, very few
executive deferred compensation plans are pure "excess benefit"
plans as that term envisions plans maintained solely for the
purpose of providing benefits for employees in excess of the
maximum benefit and contribution limitations of I.R.C. section
415.41 While employers are free to determine a qualified plan's
benefit or allocation formula, the limitations of I.R.C. section 415
may prevent an executive from receiving the full amount of the
benefit or allocation.42 Thus an employer may provide for an excess
39. See Martin v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 814, 825 (1991)

(affirming the

taxpayer's change in payment schemes shortly before termination of
employment); Veit v. Comm'r ("Veit IF), 8 T.C. 919 (1949) (permitting the

taxpayer's election to change payment schemes even though the amounts were
determinable); Veit v. Comm'r ("Veit 1"), 8 T.C. 809, 818 (1947), acq. 1947-2

C.B.4 (permitting the taxpayer's deferral election even though most of the
services had been performed as the amount due was not definitely
determinable); C.E. Gullet v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 1067 (stating that "the
doctrine of constructive receipt is to be sparingly used; that amounts due from
a corporation but unpaid, are not to be included in the income of an individual
reporting his income on a cash receipts basis, unless it appears that the money

was available to him, that the corporation was able and ready to pay him, that
his right to received was not restricted, and that his failure to receive resulted

from exercise of his own choice.").
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(5) (2000) (corresponds to ERISA § 4(b)(5)).
41. Id. See also 29 U.S.C.§ 1002(36) (2000) (corresponds to ERISA §

3(36)) (defining an "excess benefit plan" as "a plan maintained by an employer
solely for the purpose of providing benefits for certain employees in excess of
the limitations on contributions and benefits imposed by section 415 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 on plans to which that section applies, without
regard to whether the plan is funded.").
42. See I.R.C. § 415 (2000) (limiting benefits payable from a qualified
defined benefit plan to the lesser of $160,000 (indexed) or 100% of final
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benefit plan intended to work in tandem with the qualified plan by
providing benefits in excess of those limited by I.R.C. section 415
(i.e., to the extent full benefits or deferrals may not be realized
under the qualified plan due to the maximum limitations of I.R.C.
section 415, the excess benefit plans provides for the difference).
When ERISA was passed, I.R.C. section 415 was the sole
limitation on the level of benefits or allocations for qualified
retirement or profit sharing plans. However, with the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Congress added another limitation to the level of
benefits or deferrals by adding I.R.C. section 401(a)(17), which
imposed a maximum dollar amount of an employee's compensation
which could be considered under the plan.43 Suddenly, an
executive's benefits under the qualified plan were no longer
limited solely by I.R.C. section 415. However, ERISA's exemption
for "excess benefit" plans was not amended to reflect this new
distinction. Thus, ERISA's exception for "excess benefit" plans has
limited applicability as nonqualified plans designed as
supplemental plans work in tandem with the qualified plan to
provide benefits or deferrals restricted by both I.R.C. sections 415
and 401(a)(17).
Even though a complete exemption may not be available,
ERISA provides additional exemptions for certain of the
substantive and procedural requirements for other types of
executive deferred compensation plans. Unfunded pension plans
intended for "a select group of management or highly compensated
employees" are exempt from ERISA's participation, vesting, and
distribution requirements;" minimum funding standards;" and
fiduciary rules. 6 These types of plans are commonly referred to as
"top hat" plans, and by their very nature, must be discriminatory.
The DOL studied the issue of what employee group would be
considered as members of the top hat group, but issued little
guidance on the subject.47 It appears that the Code's definitions of
average pay, beginning at normal retirement age, as a life annuity or joint &
survivor annuity for married participants and limits allocations under

qualified defined contribution plan to the lesser of $30,000 (indexed) or 100%
of compensation).
43. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 208S § 1106(d)(1) (1986) (amending
I.R.C. § 401(a) by inserting a new paragraph (17)).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) (2000) (corresponds to ERISA § 201(2)).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(3) (2000) (corresponds to ERISA § 301(a)(3)).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1) (2000) (correspnds to ERISA §,401(a)(1)).
47. See 57 Fed. Reg. 16, 977 (April 27, 1992) (noting that the project of

determining what group constituted a "select group of management or highly
compensated" was withdrawn on Feb. 24, 1992). The DOL provided guidance
as to what constitutes a top hat plan:
Congress recognized that certain individuals, by virtue of their position
or compensation level, have the ability to affect or substantially
influence, through negotiation or otherwise, the design and operation of
their deferred compensation plan, taking into consideration any risks
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"key employees" and/or "highly compensated employees" (used for
qualified plan purposes) are not necessarily applicable in
determining ERISA's top hat group.' While the top hat exception
does not appear as a statutory exemption under ERISA's reporting
and disclosure requirements, the DOL regulations provide an
administrative exemption for such plans from many of the
reporting and disclosure requirements." Thus, any documents
setting forth the terms of the top hat plan are not required to be
filed with the DOL for public inspection, nor are such documents
made available to employees and shareholders of the employer. In
the wake of the Enron scandal, the DOL may wish to revisit these
regulations and impose more stringent disclosure rules for top hat
plans. The above exemptions for excess benefit or top hat plans
also require that such plan be unfunded, a term that is not defined
by ERISA. Although ERISA was passed in 1974, it was not until
1985 that the DOL stated its position as to what constitutes an
"unfunded" plan for purposes of these exemptions." The DOL has
indicated that the use of a trust to provide benefits from a top hat
plan does not render the plan funded for ERISA purposes, if the
trust assets are subject to the claims of the employer's creditors.5'

attendant thereto, and, therefore, would not need the substantive rights

and protections of Title I [of ERISA].
DOL Adv. Op. 90-14A (May 8, 1990).
48. See DOL Adv. Op. No. 75-63 (July 22, 1975) (affirming that coverage
of key employees who earned over $18,200 and were "exempt" constituted a
top hat plan); DOL Adv. Op. No. 75-64 (Aug. 1, 1975) (noting that a plan

covering key executives and managerial employees representing less than 4%
of the number of active employees and earning an average compensation of

more than $28,000 compared to $19,000 for all other management employees
was a top hat plan).

Compare DOL Adv. Op. No. 85-37A (Oct. 25, 1985)

(declining to hold that a plan covering employees "on the executive payroll"
and numbering 50 out of 750 total employees was a top hat plan).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-23; see supra text accompanying note 36.
50. 13 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 702 (1986):
[T]he Department is generally of the view that any determination of
'funded' or 'unfunded' status of a plan of deferred compensation requires
an examination of the surrounding facts and circumstances, including

the status of the plan under non-ERISA law. With particular regard to
the development of regulations concerning 'top-hat' plans, the
Department recognizes, and must ensure, that employers design and

maintain these plans only for a select group of management or highly
compensated employees, that is, employees who may not need the

substantive protections of Title I of ERISA.
Id.
51. The various "rabbi trust vehicles":
[Were devised and predicated on consideration of tax code provisions,
regulations and doctrines concerning the deferral of income. In the
absence of pertinent legislative history defining 'unfunded' for purposes
of Title I of ERISA, the Department believes that the case of 'Top-Hat'
plans (as well as excess benefit plans) the positions adopted by the
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Case law affirms such result by holding that setting aside assets
in order to provide deferred compensation does not render the plan
funded, provided these assets are subject to the claims of the

employer's creditors. 2 Thus, the DOL affirmed that a top hat plan
that is unfunded for tax purposes will be regarded as unfunded for
ERISA purposes, providing an exemption from ERISA's various
requirements as well as avoiding any current taxation for covered
executives, the best of both worlds.
Specific Tax Rules for Executive Deferred CompensationPlans
There are four potential ways of imposing taxation on benefits
accrued under an executive deferred compensation plan prior to
actual receipt by the executive: (1) the property rules of I.R.C.
section 83; (2) the "constructive receipt" doctrine of I.R.C. section
61; (3) the "economic benefit" doctrine of I.R.C. section 61; or (4)
the "vested accrued benefit" tax under I.R.C. section 402(b).
Application of any one of these theories may result in immediate
taxation to the executive on amounts deferred under an executive
deferred compensation plan. Hence, particular attention must be
Service regarding the tax consequences to trust beneficiaries of the
creation of, or contributions to, a 'rabbi trust' should be accorded
significant weight under Title I. Thus, it has been the working premise
of the Department that a Top-Hat' Plan or excess benefit plan would not
fail to be 'unfunded' solely because there is maintained in connection
with such plan a 'rabbi trust.'
Id. See also DOL Adv. Op. 92-13A (May 19, 1992) (indicating that the
Service's position regarding the tax consequences to trust beneficiaries
covered under .a rabbi trust "should be afforded significant weight under
Title I [of ERISA]"); DOL Adv. Op. 91-16A (Apr. 5, 1991) (stating that the
Department's position that a top hat or excess benefit plan is not regarded
as unfunded solely because it is maintained in connection with a rabbi
trust); DOL Adv. Op. 90-14A (May 8, 1990) (noting that the plan was not
funded as the employee-participants had no interest in any assets of the
employer, other than unsecured general creditors); DOL Adv. Op. 89-22A
(Sept. 21, 1989) (finding that the plan was unfounded as all benefits were
payable from the employer's general assets and the participants' rights
were no greater than those of other unsecured creditors and were not
subject to assignment, attachment, transfer or encumbrance). See also
Letter from Elliot I. Daniel, Asst. Admn'r for the Department of Labor to
Richard H. Manfreda, Chief, Individual Income Tax Branch, IRS, (Dec. 13,
1985) (reprinted in Howard Pianko, Nonqualified Deferred Compensation:
Rabbi Trust PlanningIssues, in the 16Annual Employee Benefits Inst. 106,
121, & 123 (1986) (PLI 1986)).
52. See generally Belsky v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 818 F.2d 661 (8th Cir.
1987); Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 848 F.
Supp. 1515 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Miller v. Heller, 915 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Bruno v. Hershey Foods Corp., 964 F. Supp. 159 (D.N.J. 1997); Moore v.
Acme Corrugated Box Co., No. 97-2150, 1997 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 11722 (E.D. Pa.
1997), affd without opinion, 182 F.3d 904 (3d Cir. 1999); Carrabba v. Tom
Thumb Food & Drugs, Inc., No. 4:96-CV-651-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21026
(N.D. Tex. 1997).
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made in the drafting of these plans to avoid such result. Obviously
the worst result for an executive is immediate taxation on
amounts that have been deferred and are not currently available
to pay the resulting tax.
While all four tax doctrines are theoretically applicable, the
use of one or more of the doctrines generally depends on how the
executive deferred compensation plan is designed. Since there are
no prescribed rules for designing these plans, there could be an
infinite number of design possibilities. However, three types of
designs are currently most popular: (1) a salary reduction plan
whereby executives elect to defer current compensation (e.g.,
bonuses) until a future date or the employer defers the payment of
compensation until certain performance criteria have been
satisfied; (2) mirror Code section 401(k) nonqualified plans which
permit the executive to make a single deferral under the
nonqualified plan and a subsequent distribution to the section
401(k) plan equal to the maximum deferral allowed under that
plan, 3 with the ability to obtain additional employer matches and
earnings on such amounts; and (3) supplemental executive
retirement plans (known as SERPs) that are typically funded
additional
to provide
solely through employer dollars
compensation at some future date with or without various
handcuffs (i.e., provisions that provide for a forfeiture of benefits
upon certain events, such as the executive's premature resignation
or subsequent employment with a competitor) or to provide
additional excess retirement benefits that cannot be provided
through the employer's qualified plans. The overall total or
complete variety of executive deferred compensation plans
maintained by Enron is unknown; however, we do know that
Enron executives were able to defer up to thirty percent of their
income and all of their bonuses under a deferred compensation
plan.' As the various tax rules are explained, their application to
53. The Service's position regarding tandem I.R.C. § 401(k) plans has

developed through a series of private letter rulings. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-17037 (Feb. 1, 1993) (affirming a single election prior to January 1 of the

calendar year in which the compensation would be earned under the
nonqualified plan with a subsequent election no later than January 31 in the

following year to have a certain amount contributed to the Section 401(k)
plan), which was subsequently withdrawn by the Service in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-

14-041. But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-038 (July 28, 1995) (affirming the use of
a "wrap-around" 401(k) election whereby the executive's election to defer a
certain percentage under the 401(k) plan could be automatically applied to the
nonqualified mirror 401(k) plan without any adverse constructive receipt
issues).
54. See Eric Berger, Deferred Payments Under Fire, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Aug. 16, 2002 (stating that Enron permitted executives to defer up to 30% of
income and all of their bonuses under a deferred compensation plan that was
similar to a § 401(k) plan, available at http://www.chron.comcs/CDA/story.hts/
specialenron/1538191 (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
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one or more of these particular types of executive deferred
compensation plan will also be discussed.
Application of§ 83
I.R.C. section 83 was added in 1969 to modify both the
common law timing and character treatment of certain deferred
compensation payments. 5 Its target was the transfer of property
for the performance of compensation in hopes of converting
ordinary income into capital gains, as well as the postponement of
the timing of taxation. Under the prior rules, property could be
transferred to an executive subject to restriction, thereby
permitting future appreciation to be taxable as capital gains when
the property was later sold, in lieu of reporting income at the time
the property was transferred. 7
As the payment of cash
compensation, either presently or deferred, does not present any
appreciation potential, I.R.C. section 83 was limited to property
transferred which had the potential for future appreciation (e.g.,
stock or stock options).58
If the executive deferred compensation plan merely provides
for the employer's promise to pay cash benefits at some future
date, the Service's regulations state that the executive's benefit is
"unfunded and unsecured" and therefore is not property for Code §
83 purposes. 59 The Tax Court has interpreted "unfunded and
unsecured" for this purpose as follows: "funding occurs ... [o]nly at
55. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969)

(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 83 (1990)).
56. For an excellent background of the history of I.R.C. § 83, see Carter G.
Bishop & Marian McMahon Durkin, Nonqualified Deferred Compensation
Plans:A Review and Critique, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 42 (1991). The rules
of I.R.C. § 83 provide that property transferred by an employer in connection
with the performance of services will be taxable to the employee in the first
tax year in which he/she has rights to such property that are (1) transferable
or (2) no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. I.R.C. § 83(c) states
that property is only transferable if it can be transferred free of forfeiture risk
and that a risk of substantial forfeiture exits if the employee performs future
services to keep the property. Thus, unless the employee can sell the property
subject to the forfeiture risk, he/she will be taxed on the value of the property
when the forfeiture restriction lapses. I.R.C. § 83(b) provides an election for
the executive to accelerate the taxation of the transfer of property to the initial
transfer date; thereafter, any subsequent appreciation will be taxed as capital
gains when the property is ultimately sold. If the employee forfeits the
property, the I.R.C. § 83 regulation provide the employee with a loss deduction
(equal to the amount paid for the property) instead of the income previously
taxed.
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (1966).
58. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 500, reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027 (noting that § 83 was targeted to correct an abuse in the
taxation of restricted non-statutory employee stock plans).
59. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (noting that a guarantee to pay does not
make the employer's promise secured as it is still only a promise to pay).
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the time when the beneficiary obtains a nonforfeitable economic or
financial benefit in the trust or insurance policy," and security
requires more than just the employer's promise to pay." As long as
the executive's rights under the deferred compensation plan are no
greater than that of an unsecured general creditor and the
executive has no preferred rights over any assets of the employer
in conjunction with the deferrals, § 83 is not applicable.
Thus for purposes of this article, I.R.C. section 83 will not be
applicable to the types of executive deferred compensation plans
being discussed. However, the applicability of I.R.C. section 83
may be highly relevant if such plan was "funded" with life
insurance (granting the executive with certain rights and
benefits)6 or with stock or stock options. Then such plan may be
regarded as funded or secured for Code § 83 purposes, thereby
subjecting the executive to taxation once he/she has the ability to
assign the property free of forfeiture risk" or when the property is
no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.6 '
Only
prohibiting assignment of his/her property rights or subjecting
those property rights to a "substantial risk of forfeiture" can
further delay the taxation for the executive if property is involved.
It should be noted that there is a different timing rule
applicable to executive deferred compensation plans for FICA tax
purposes. Those rules are similar to those of I.R.C. section 83 and
may subject the deferrals to FICA tax immediately regardless of
whether there is any current federal income tax consequences.C

60. Childs v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 634, 651 (1994), affd per curiam, 89 F.3d
856 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
61. See Frost v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 89, 91 (1969) (imputing immediate
taxation due to an executive deferred compensation plan which provided life
insurance which paid the face value to the employee's estate in the event of
death prior to age 65 and transferred the value of the policy to the employee
upon attainment of age 65, disability or termination of employment). But see
Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 C.B. 193 (refusing to apply the economic benefit on life
insurance purchased for the executive compensation plan as the employer was
the beneficiary and the employee received no benefits under the policy).
62. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(d) (noting that property is transferable for §
83 purposes if the individual has the right to select, assign, or pledge his
interest in the property).
63. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (stating that property is subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture if the rights to such property are contingent upon
future performance, or refraining from performance).
64. See § 3121(v)(2) of The Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L.
98-21, § 324(b), 97 Stat. 65 (1983), created a special timing rule for deferred
compensation benefits, subjecting them to taxation at the later of (1) the time
of the performance of services or (2) when such benefits are no longer subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Thus for these benefits that are not subject
to any substantial risk of forfeiture, benefits are taxable under FICA when the
services are performed. For many executives, this will result in Medicare tax
of 1.45% on all such amounts (as there is no maximum taxable wage base used
on the medical portion of the FICA tax rate). However, if such benefits are
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Application of the ConstructiveReceipt Doctrine
I.R.C. section 61 taxes cash or any fair market value of
property received for compensation for services by an employee in
the tax year of receipt. This includes fees, commissions, fringe
benefits and similar items received as compensation for services.' 5
The constructive receipt rule dates back to Article 67 under the
Revenue Act of 1913 that was added to reduce a taxpayer's
attempt to defer the reporting of income by delaying the receipt of
property.
Under the timing rules of I.R.C. section 451(a),
compensation to a cash-basis taxpayer is taxable when it is either
actually received or constructively received. 7 The regulations
impose taxation on such compensation if it "is credited to his
account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he
may draw upon it at any time."6 Thus as a tax-planning tool, a
taxpayer must comply with the constructive receipt rules to delay
taxation of the receipt of benefits, as opposed to avoidance of any
tax.
The purpose of the constructive receipt rule is to impose
current taxation if the taxpayer has an unfettered control in
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, the FICA payments are delayed until
the risk lapses; if the lapse occurs at the executive's retirement, this will
subject the entire amount of the benefits to FICA taxes.
65. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2000). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a).
66. Pub. L. No. 254, § 213, 40 Stat. 1057, 1065 (1919) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) Defining "gross income" as:
[I]nclud[ing] gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or
compensation for personal service ... of whatever kind and in whatever
form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce,
or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out
of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from
interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business
carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from
any source whatever. The amount of all such items shall be included in
the gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer.

Id.
67. See I.R.C. § 451 (2000), (providing "[the amount at any time of gross
income shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year in which it is
received by the taxpayer, unless, under the method of accounting used in
computing taxable income, such amount is to be properly accounted for as a
different period"). To prevent the cash basis taxpayer from manipulating the
timing of the receipt of income the regulations provides that a cash basis
taxpayer is taxed on income when it is received or could be constructively
received. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (2002).
68. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (stating "[ilncome although not actually
reduced to a taxpayer's possession is constructively received by him in the
taxable year during which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or
otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that

he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of the intention
to withdraw had been given.). "However, income is not constructively received
if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or
restrictions." Id.
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determining when income will be taxable. In Rev. Rul. 60-31, the
Service limited the application of this doctrine to situations where
the employer was ready, Willing and able to pay the compensation
to the employee, but payment was not made due to the employee's
failure to request such compensation. 69 The taxpayer could not
deliberately turn his/her back on the receipt of income and
postpone the tax year for inclusion of income. ° The two key
elements in the constructive receipt doctrine focus on whether the
employee's right to receive the deferral is restricted and whether
he/she is able to exercise choice regarding the timing of the
benefits.7
Timing of the Deferral under the Constructive Receipt Doctrine
Timing rules under the constructive receipt doctrine are
relevant for executive compensation plans that are designed as
"salary reduction" plans or supplemental plans, permitting
employee elections to defer a set percentage of current or
supplemental compensation. The constructive receipt doctrine
requires that an employee's election to defer compensation be
made in a "timely" fashion. The Service has long maintained that
the election to defer must be made before the period of service that
involves the rendering of services." In this regard, the "period of
69. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, modified by Rev. Rul. 64-279, 1964-2
C.B.121, is the cornerstone ruling by the Service regarding the doctrine of
constructive receipt, in which it states "[ulnder the doctrine of constructive
receipt, a taxpayer may not deliberately turn his back upon income and
thereby select a year for which he will report it ... [nior may a taxpayer, by
private agreement, postpone receipt of income from one tax year to another."
Id. In addition, constructive receipt applies to the employee when "the money
was available to him, that the corporation was able and ready to pay him, that
the right to receive was not restricted, and that his failure to receive resulted
from exercise of his own choice." Id.
70. See Childs v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 634, 654 (1994), affd per curiam 89
F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating "[u]nder the constructive-receipt doctrine, a
taxpayer recognizes income when the taxpayer has an unqualified, vested
right to receive immediate payment."). "Generally, there must be an amount
that is immediately due and owing that the obligor is ready, willing, and able
to pay. The amount owed must either be credited to the taxpayer or set aside
for the taxpayer so that the taxpayer has an unrestricted right to receive it
immediately, and the taxpayer being aware of these facts, decides to accept
the payment" Id. See also Bank of Chattanooga v. Comm'r, 29 B.T.A. 63, 67
(1933); Basila v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 111, 116 (1961); Young Door Co., E. Div. v.
Comm'r, 40 T.C. 890, 894 (1963).
71. In 1978, the Service attempted to reverse its ruling on constructive
receipt by proposing regulations that would subject an employee's election to
defer compensation, regardless of whether the election was made irrevocably
prior to the date of service, to taxation. Due to the public response, Congress
prohibited the Service in the Tax Reform Act of 1978 from altering the
constructive receipt rules in effect on February 1, 1978 for taxable entities.
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
72. See Veit v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 809, 816 (1947), acq., 1947-2 C.B. 4 (stating
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service" refers to the tax year of the employee, which is generally
the calendar year.73 As discussed below, the courts have taken a
less restrictive approach, permitting deferral elections after the
rendition of services provided that the employee does not yet have
an unfettered right to receive the compensation.
In Veit v. Commissioner ("Veit 1"),71 the Tax Court held that a
parties' subsequent agreement to change the date of distribution
for deferred compensation could be made without causing the
monies to be constructively received. Under an original salary
agreement made at the beginning of 1939, Veit agreed that a
portion of his compensation would be determined using company
profits for 1939 and 1940 and subsequently paid in 1941. 7" In
November of 1940, the parties agreed to defer the 1940 portion
until 1942. As of that time, the amount of Veit's share in the 1940
profits was not yet ascertainable, nor available for withdrawal.76
The Tax Court rejected the Service's application of constructive
receipt for the 1941 tax year as the parties had entered into an
arm's length contract prior to 1941 to defer Veit's share of the 1940
portion. 7 According to the court, to apply the constructive receipt
doctrine in 1941 to Veit would require it to hold that the
subsequent agreement between the parties was "a mere
subterfuge and a sham for the purpose of enabling petitioner to
postpone his income tax ...to another year."78 Due to the bona
fide agreement between both parties, the court affirmed the delay
of taxation of such amounts until actually received.
In a similar case, Oates v. Commissioner, the Tax Court did
not agree with the Service's application of the constructive receipt
doctrine as the parties entered into a similar subsequent
agreement that altered the mode of distribution.79 In that case,
several insurance agents (including Oates) agreed to the payment
of deferred compensation based on renewal commissions in
varying amounts from 1944 through 1946.80 The employer later
the Service maintained that the taxpayer's initial decision regarding the
timing for payment of future benefits had to be made prior to the rendition of
any services.). In that case, the agreement had originally provided that a
portion of the 1940 profits would be paid in 1941 to the taxpayer; however in
November 1941, the parties agreed to a subsequent deferral of payment until
1942. Id. See also Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698 and Rev. Proc. 92-65,
1992-2 C.B. 428.
73. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
74. 8 T.C. 809, 818 (1947), acq., 1947-2 C.B. 4.
75. Id. at 810-11.
76. Id. at 815.
77. Id. at 816.
78. Id.
79. 18 T.C. 570, 584-85 (1952), affd 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953), acq.
1960-1 C.B. 5.
80. Id. at 582 (paying renewal commissions in the amount of $33,174.98 in
1944, $60,754.62 in 1945 and $41,858.80 in 1946).
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amended the plan, with the consent of the agents' association, to
permit the agents to make an irrevocable election in 1944 to stay
under the original distribution scheme or to take the deferrals in
the form of $1,000 over 180 months.81 The Service attempted to
impute income to Oates, a cash basis taxpayer, who had elected for
the extended payment scheme, on the full amount of the
commissions during the years 1944, 1945 and 1946, in lieu of the
actual payments received over the 180 months." The Tax Court
rejected the Service's application of the constructive receipt
doctrine and affirmed the parties' subsequent alteration of the
contract in 1944 to alter the distribution scheme.'
The Service
subsequently acquiesced to the Veit I and Oates decisions, noting
that the subsequent elections to change the timing of benefits were
made before the benefits were ascertainable or pursuant to a bona
fide contract between the parties.'
Two other constructive receipt cases subsequently followed
Veit I and Oates, in which the Service's position was not affirmed
by the Tax Court. In the case of Martin v. Commissioner,5
executives who were participants of a deferred compensation
created in the 1960's and 1970's were given the option of
exchanging benefits under that plan with benefits under a new
"shadow" stock plan. The new plan offered the choice between
lump sum or annuity form of payment at retirement. Several of
the executives switched to the new stock plan, elected the annuity
form of payment and retired. Because the executives were
provided the choice between a lump sum and annuity form under
the new plan, the Service held that they were in constructive
receipt of the lump sum amount. The Tax Court disagreed,
dismissing the application of the constructive receipt doctrine
where the deferred compensation plan has been superseded by a
subsequent bona fide plan.
In Veit v. Commissioner (known as "Veit IF), the Service
focused on a two-year contract entered into during 1939 between
the parties for the payment of compensation based on profits, and
the 1940 portion of profits would be payable in 1942.86 By the end
of 1940, the 1940 profits were ascertainable. Then in December
1941, the parties agreed to pay the 1940 profits in five annual
installments instead of two payments in 1942. The Service held
that the 1940 profits were constructively received in full in 1942 as
the subsequent agreement to extend the deferral period was
entered into just five days before the end of the 1941 tax year
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 583-84.
Id.
Id. at 584.
See supra notes 74 and 79.

85. 96 T.C. 814 (1991).
86. 8 T.C.M. 919, 922 (1949).
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when the amounts were ascertainable. The Tax Court disagreed,
noting that under the existing arrangements Veit did not have the
power to demand or withdraw the full amount of the 1940 profit in
1942, and therefore were not in constructive receipt of such
amounts. 7
The Service did not acquiesce to the Martin and Veit II
decisions, but recognized that its position in those cases (i.e., that
compensation cannot be deferred once it has been earned) would
not be defensible in light of the Tax Court cases." The Service
continues to enforce its position (regarding the timing of the
voluntary election) in the context of plans requesting a favorable
private letter ruling.88 In the first of two revenue procedures on
the issue, the Service stated that any election to defer receipt of
compensation "must be made before the beginning of the period of
service for which the compensation is payable . . ." in order to
obtain a favorable ruling. ° In its second revenue procedure, the
Service inserted the word "generally" into this requirement,
raising in the minds of practitioners whether a deferral election
could be altered during the tax year but only with respect to
compensation earned from services after the election.8 ' Due to the
adverse Tax Court rulings, the Service has not litigated in this
area, resulting in some ambiguity for employers drafting the terms
of executive deferred compensation plans.
Salary Deferral Elections
At the same time as the issuance of Rev. Proc. 71-19, the
Service was also grappling as to whether salary deferral elections
made by employees, under either a qualified or a nonqualified
plan, should be taxed at the time of the deferral as opposed to the
actual time of receipt. By 1978, the Service issued proposed
regulations under I.R.C. section 61 which would have imposed
immediate taxation on any salary deferrals made pursuant to an
87. See id. (noting "... there was never a time when the [amount] was

unqualifiedly subject to petitioner's demand or withdrawal.").
88. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,196 (Jan .16, 1973) (stating that "[tihe
position of the Service has generally been that income cannot be deferred once
it has been earned ... ") "It is questionable whether the Service could defend
such a position in litigation ... Based on these cases and the long standing
acquiescence, it cannot be stated that a deferral of compensation is only valid
if entered into before the performance of services." Id.
89. Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698, as amplified by Rev. Proc. 92-65,

1992-2 C.B. 428.
90. Id. at § 10.05 (permitting two exceptions to the general rule: (1) in the
year the plan is established, a participant may make an election to defer
compensation for services rendered after the election and within 30 days of the
plan's effective date and (2) in the first year of eligibility, a participant may
elect to defer compensation for services performed subsequent to the election
and within 30 days after reaching eligibility).

91. Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428.
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employee's voluntary election." Such rule would be applicable
regardless of whether the deferral was subject to a substantial risk
of forfeiture.93 If such proposal had been finalized, executive
compensation plans funded through employee deferrals would be
nonexistent today.
Congress' reaction to these proposed regulations was swift,
specifically affirming the use of elective deferrals under qualified
plans through the addition of I.R.C. section 401(k) 94 and stating
that the taxation of income under nonqualified deferred
compensation plans would be governed by the principles set forth
in regulations, rulings, and judicial decisions that were in effect on
February 1, 1978. 9 This legislative directive has resulted in a
moratorium on the Service's issuance of rulings in the constructive
receipt area, even though that topic has not been listed as a noruling area of interest.' Absence of formal guidance from the
Service has resulted in host of creative methods to test the use of
the constructive
receipt doctrine in executive deferred
compensation plans. If Congress wishes the Service to regulate
more broadly in this area, it should lift this moratorium and direct
the Service to issue guidance to stem the abuses in this area.
SubstantialRisk of Forfeiture under the Constructive Receipt
Doctrine
The Service makes an exception to its constructive receipt
rules; thereby permitting elections to be made after the beginning
of the performance of services provided the deferral is subject to a
"substantial risk of forfeiture." 97 Such risk must impose "a
significant limitation or duty" on the expected payment to the
employee (e.g., continued employment with the employer for at
least two years). 8 If the payment is subject to forfeiture due to a
92. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 4638 (February 3, 1978)

(stating that "payment of an amount of a taxpayer's basic or regular
compensation fixed by contract, statute, or otherwise (or supplements to such
compensation, such as bonuses, or increase in such compensation) is, at the
taxpayer's individual option, deferred to a taxable year later than that in

which such amount would have been payable but for his exercise of such
option, the amount shall be treated as received by the taxpayer in such earlier

taxable year."). "For purposes of this paragraph, it is immaterial that the
taxpayer's right in the amount payment of which is so deferred become
forfeitable by reason of his exercise of the option to defer payment." Id.
93. Id.
94. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 131, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).

95. Id. at § 132.
96. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 99-3, 1999-1 I.R.B. 103.
97. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, modified by Rev. Rul. 64-279, 1964-2
C.B. 121. See also Childs v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 634, 654 (1994), affd per curiam
89 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 1996).
98. I.R.C. § 83(c)(1), 26 U.S.C. § 83(c)(1) (2000), and Treas. Reg. § 1.833(c)(1).
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specific event (e.g., subsequent employment with a competitor),
such event must be a definite and realistic possibility.99 This
determination is a question of fact.0 0 Under the Service's proposed
regulations under I.R.C. section 61 which were repudiated by
Congress, voluntary deferrals of salary would be subject to
immediate taxation regardless of whether the deferral was subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture.10'
If Congress lifts the
moratorium on the Service's issuance of constructive receipt
guidance, it is not anticipated that the Service would attempt to
tax voluntary deferrals of salary under executive compensation
plans that were subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
The use of forfeiture provisions may be limited depending on
the type of executive deferred compensation plan under
examination. If the executive is electing to defer current or
supplemental compensation that has already been earned, it was
quite unlikely that the executive would be willing to agree to a
subsequent forfeiture of such earned income. However, the use of
forfeiture provisions may be quite useful in SERP-type
arrangements that are funded through employer contributions, not
employee elections. Subjecting executive deferred compensation to
continued employment and/or to performance under specific
criteria may be beneficial to the employer and avoids current
taxation to the executive as it represents a substantial risk of
forfeiture. Forfeiture of a valuable right to payment is also
considered a substantial limitation for constructive receipt
purposes.' ° This latter example is best understood in the context
of a stock appreciation
right plan that is not within the scope of
this article.," 3
99. See Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971- 1 C.B. 698, as amplified by Rev. Proc. 92-

65, 1992 - 2 C.B. 428, (stating "[a] substantial forfeiture will not be considered
to exist unless its conditions impose upon the employee a significant limitation

or duty which will require a meaningful effort on the part of the employee to
fulfill and there is a definite possibility that the event which will cause the
forfeiture could occur").
100. See Childs v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 634, 654 (stating that "[tihe doctrine

of constructive receipt is essentially a question of fact.").
101. See supra note 92.

102. Rev. Rul. 80-300, 1980-2 C.B. 165.
103. See id. (examining whether an employee's stock appreciation right
("SAR") under an executive deferred compensation plan resulted in
constructive receipt when the employee had the opportunity to exercise the

right or when the employee actually exercised the right and ruling that the
employee was not in constructive receipt of his SAR until he actually exercised
such right, as the exercise resulted in a forfeiture of his rights to obtain future

appreciation of the stock and thus constituted a substantial risk of forfeiture).
It is not known whether the Service would render a similar conclusion if the
employee's deferred benefit was cash but was structured to fluctuate based on
market indicators or designated investments.

One could argue that the

employee was not in constructive receipt of such benefits until he/she requests
the distribution, which would then forego the right to any future appreciation
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From the Service's perspective, the use of possible forfeiture
provisions may seem to be infinite depending on the employer in
question (e.g., non-compete clauses, availability of consultation,
continued employment, etc.) and therefore problematic in
formulating a set of concrete rules. Coupled with Congress'
imposed moratorium, the Service has had little desire to
promulgate new rules or litigate in this area.
For executives who are controlling shareholders of the
employer, the Service will not issue an advance ruling for
executive deferred compensation plans using forfeitures for such
individuals, as the employee's control of receipt of monies is not
realistically subject to substantial risk of forfeiture." Again, the
Service's position has not met with an enthusiastic response from
the courts. The Second Circuit will not automatically presume the
corporation and the shareholder as a single entity, thereby
permitting discussion as to whether the shareholder-executive
could have acted independently from its employer.10'
Obviously, situations such as Enron, where the executives
were not necessarily controlling shareholders but certainly were
insiders, cause concern for Congress as such individuals
undoubtedly were in a position to take advantage of any
distribution provisions that were available under their covered
executive compensation plans. By bestowing greater regulatory
authority to the Service, rules dealing with insider executives
could be addressed.
Withdrawal Rights under the ConstructiveReceipt Doctrine
In enunciating the doctrine of constructive receipt, the
Service has focused on whether the taxpayer has an unrestricted
right to receive the monies.'0 6 Clearly, the executive's unfettered
right to withdraw monies from an executive deferred compensation
plan would result in immediate taxation. What withdrawal rights
short of an unfettered right would be permissible?
As the
constructive receipt rule focuses on the employee's exercise of
control, the Service has permitted premature withdrawals in the
of the market or the designated investments.
104. Rev. Proc. 2001-3, 2001-1 I.R.B. 111, § 3.01(34). See Also Rev. Rul.
72-317, 1972-1 CB. 128 (holding that the controlling shareholder/employee
was in constructive receipt of deferred salary payments due to his power to
distribute salary as he saw fit).
105. Casale v. Comm'r, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957); Congleton v. Comm'r,

38 T.C.M. (CCH) 584 (1979).
106. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 178, modified by Rev. Rul. 64-

279, 1964-2 C.B. 121 (limiting the application of the constructive receipt
doctrine to cases where "the money was available to him, that the corporation
was able and ready to pay him, that the right to receive was not restricted,
and that his failure to receive resulted from exercise of his own choice."). See
also Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100.
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event of "unforeseeable emergencies" 7 and will advance a private
letter ruling for such withdrawals under an executive deferred
compensation plan." 8 Such emergencies must be caused by an
event that is outside the control of the employee and would result
in severe financial hardship to the employee if not granted. 0 9 This
hardship withdrawal feature appears similar, but not identical, to
the one used in section 401(k) plans and is fairly restrictive in
nature.
The Service has also consented to the use of certain events
(commonly seen in qualified plans) that may be used under the
terms of an executive deferred compensation plan as triggering
events for the employee to receive or otherwise accelerate
payments under the plan, without resulting in any premature
taxation until the actual time of payment. In Rev. Rul. 60-31, the
Service approved of the use of the following events for the
employee to access payment of benefits: attainment of a certain
age; partial or total incapacitation; performance of services for a
certain period of time; termination of employment; or, change from

107. See Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428, § 3.01(c) (stating that an
"[u]nforeseeable emergency must be defined in the plan as an unanticipated
emergency that is caused by an event beyond the control of the participant or
beneficiary and that would result in severe financial hardship to the
individual if early withdrawal were not permitted."). The plan must further
provide that any early withdrawal approved by the employer is limited to the
amount necessary to meet the emergency." Compare with Treas. Reg. §
1.401(k)-1(d)92)(iv)(A) (permitting hardship distributions for a dependent's
college expenses or a homeowner's purchase expenses) with Treas. Reg. §
1.457-2(h)(4) (prohibiting distributions for college and home situations).
108. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-31-024 (May 7, 1990) (reviewing regulation
1.451-2(a) for the proposition that income is constructively received, and
taxable, in the year it is credited to the taxpayer's account, set apart for the
taxpayer, or "otherwise made available so that the taxpayer may draw upon it
at any time or could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of
intention to withdraw had been given"); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-47-054 (Nov. 25,
1988) (allowing payments of benefits under plan in the case of an "unforeseen
emergency," such as a "severe medical emergency which creates a severe
financial hardship that cannot reasonably be relieved by insurance or the
participant's personal resources"); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-33-036 (May 16, 1983)
(defining "unforeseen emergency" as a "severe financial hardship resulting
from events beyond the control of the participant"); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-27-039
(Apr. 18, 1985) (concluding that participants of an unfunded deferred
compensation plan need not report deferred amounts until the taxable year(s)
when the amounts are actually paid or otherwise made available).
109. See § 3 Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428 (stating that the Service
relies on the Treas Reg. § 1.457-2(h)(4) in defining severe financial hardship
"resulting from a sudden and unexpected illness or accident of the
participant... arising as a result of events beyond the control of the
participant.").
Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(2)(iv)(A) (permitting
hardship distributions for a dependent's college expenses or a homeowner's
purchase expenses) with Treas. Reg. § 1.457-2(h)(4) (prohibiting distributions
for college and home situations).
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full-time to part-time employment.11 ° The Service views these
limitations on receipt of income as substantial and thus has
decided not to impose the doctrine of constructive receipt. As the

doctrine focuses on the "will and control of the taxpayer" in
receiving the compensation, triggering events that are outside the
control of the employee should limit which events are
permissible."' Given the necessary authority to act, the Service
may certainly decide to limit the list of triggering event for

insiders and controlling shareholders.
Application of the Economic Benefit Doctrine
While the constructive receipt doctrine assumes that the
taxpayer is in receipt of income but narrows its focus as to when
(i.e., its timing) such income is received, the economic benefit
doctrine focuses on whether the taxpayer has any ownership or
other "economic benefits" in property (i.e., something with
property rights) that should warrant any taxation at all (i.e.,
property rights).,
Thus, it clearly looks at property that the
taxpayer may have an interest in or has received in connection
with the executive deferred compensation plan. Property exists for
this purpose if the employee is conferred an economic benefit that
is equivalent to cash."' According to the Supreme Court, I.R.C.
section 61 "is broad enough to include in taxable income any
economic or financial benefit conferred on the employee as
compensation whatever the form or mode.""
In the context of executive compensation plans, the issue then
becomes whether an employer's promise to pay future benefits is

110. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, modified by Rev. Rul. 64-279, 19642 C.B.121.
111. See Furstenberg v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 755, 791 (1984) (stating that
"[t]he doctrine of constructive receipt is based on the principle that income is
received by cash method taxpayers 'when it is made subject to the will and
control of the taxpayer. . .'") (quoting Loose v. United States, 74 F.2d 147, 150
(8th Cir. 1934)). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (explaining the constructive
receipt doctrine taxes the individual when the income "is made subject to the
will and control of the taxpayer" and indicating that the use of a triggering
event that imposes a material limitation or restriction of the employee would
not result in the application of constructive receipt).
112. See Comm'r v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945) (noting that the use of
the economic benefit doctrine would eliminate any distinction between a cashmethod versus accrual-method taxpayer if the value of a mere promise to pay
future benefits could be valued and taxable currently to a cash-basis
taxpayer).
113. See Sproull v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 244, 247 (1951) affd per curiam, 195
F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952) (applying the economic benefit doctrine where the
employer placed assets in an interest bearing trust for the benefit of an
employee, which was not subject to any risk of forfeiture and therefore would
be paid to the employee).
114. See supra note 112.
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an economic benefit subject to current valuation and therefore
subject to immediate taxation. If such issue was determined solely
on the basis of economic grounds, certain employer's (e.g., IBM,
GM) mere promise to pay future benefits could certainly be valued
and taxable, whereas another employer's promises (e.g., Ma and
Pa's grocery store) may not be readily ascertainable and therefore
not taxable. The Service decided not resort to a pure economic
analysis for this purpose but instead to a more black-and-white
rule, holding that any employer's mere promise to pay future
deferred benefits is not property for this purpose.
In the case of Minor v. United States," the court applied the
economic benefit doctrine by asking whether the plaintiff (Dr.
Minor) had the current right to receive a future benefits which
were subject to current valuation. In order for the doctrine to be
utilized, the court stated that (1) the employer's promise must be
"capable of valuation," and (2) if so valued, the employee's interest
had to be
nonforfeitable and secured against the employer's
16
creditors.
In the context of executive deferred compensation plans that
are the premise of this article, the economic benefit doctrine is not
applicable. It does become relevant if the employer decides to
purchase specific assets in connection with the executive deferred
compensation plan (e.g., annuity contracts or insurance policies) or
to contribute assets to a trust for the benefits of the executives.
Under this doctrine, benefits under an executive deferred
compensation plan become immediately taxable to the executive
only if the plan is funded, such that rights in a funding asset or
vehicle are transferred to the executive and the executive's
interest in such funds is vested. 1 7 The economic benefit theory
then applies because vested amounts have been irrevocably set
aside with a third party for the benefit of the executive. No longer
are the promises tied to the employer's mere promise to pay (i.e.,
assets have been set aside) and such promises are secured for the
benefit of the executive and not the employer's creditors. If the
funding of such plan involves contributions to a trust (nonqualified
or not) for the benefit of an employee, such deferrals are also
subject to the rules of I.R.C. section 402(b)." 8 Thus, to avoid any
current income tax consequences, the executive's promise for
deferred compensation benefits must remain an unsecured
promise of the employer's, subject to the claims of its creditors.

115. 772 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985).
116. Id. at 1474 (citing Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 179).

117. Sproull v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 244, 247-48 (1951), affd 194 F.2d 541 (6th
Cir. 1952) and Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, modified by Rev. Rul. 64-279,
1964-2 C.B. 121, Situation 4.
118. 26 I.R.C. § 402(b) (2000).
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Application of the Vested Accrued Benefit Rules
If the executive's deferred compensation plan has escaped
funding and taxation thus far, the vested accrued benefit rules of
I.R.C. section 402(b) are not applicable. The Service has applied
I.R.C. section 402(b) when the employer utilizes a non-exempt
trust for an underlying deferred compensation plan and then
contributes to the trust for the payment of the promised vested
benefits.1 9 I.R.C. section 402(b)(1) requires that such amounts be
treated as gross income in accordance with the rules of I.R.C.
section 83.120 If the amounts are determined to be property within
the meaning of I.R.C. section 83, the tax rules of I.R.C. section
402(b) tax the covered employees on the increase in the value of
the "vested accrued benefit" under
the trust, as opposed to the
12
employer contributions to the trust. 1
Thus, if the executive's interest under an executive deferred
compensation plan is not regarded as property for Code § 83
purposes (i.e., subject to substantial risk of forfeiture or
nontransferable), 2 it will not be taxable for I.R.C. section 402(b)
purposes.
Application of the Various Tax Rules to PopularExecutive
Compensation Plans
Following this introduction to taxation rules, the remainder of
this article will review the various popular forms of executive
compensation plans and discuss which tax rules are applicable.
Let's start with the most basic type of executive deferred
compensation benefit, and then add various layers of security for
the executive, examining the resulting tax consequences. Under
an executive deferred compensation plan where the executive has
only an unfunded and unsecured promise from the employer to pay
compensation at some future date in time, no current taxation
results to the executive until the actual receipt of income. The
unfunded and unsecured promise to pay benefits has been
deferred, generally to a future date (e.g., death, disability,
retirement). An employer's mere promise to pay deferred benefits
is not funded as no assets are set aside for the executive, and is

119. Rev. Rul. 57-37, 1957-1 C.B. 18, modified by Rev. Rul. 57-528, 1957-2

C.B. 263. But see Philip R. Bosco, Rulings: Secular Trusts, Rabbi trusts, SCorporation FICA, and Revised Per Diem, 5 BENEFITS L. J. 2, 271 (1992)
(commenting that some employee benefits practitioners have questioned the

Service's use of I.R.C. § 402(b) to secular trusts, noting that its application
should be confined solely to Section 401(a) tax-exempt trusts that later lose

their tax-exempt status).
120. 26 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1) (2000).
121. See id. (stating that "the value of the employee's interest in the trust

shall be substituted for the fair market value of the property").
122. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (2000).
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not secured if its payment is subject to the claims of the employer's
creditors. An unfunded and unsecured promise to pay from the
employer is not taxable under either the constructive receipt nor
economic benefit rule. Neither has any property been transferred
to the executive, making I.R.C. sections 83 and 402(b) also
inapplicable.
Now let's start adding various levels of security for the
executive and test whether such assurances change the applicable
taxation of the executive's deferred benefits.
RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL:

The first layer of security that an

executive may wish to add to this unfunded and unsecured
promise is the right to receive "premature" withdrawals in
advance of the future date of expected payment. While the Service
permits voluntary withdrawals for "unforeseeable contingencies,"
such a right must be conditioned upon hardship and is narrowly
applied. Could the employer have discretion as to the timing and
manner of distribution? While the Service initially approved of
such a provision without any adverse tax consequences to the
executive, it later retreated from that position.'
In a revenue
procedure issued in 1992, the Service now requires the employer to
provide a formula or instructions under the terms of the plan if
distributions are subject to earlier withdrawals.'
However, if the executive and the employer wish to permit
greater withdrawal rights under the plan such that the executive
can voluntarily accelerate the payment of the deferrals to an
earlier date, the Service requires that the withdrawal right be
restricted or conditioned upon the occurrence of certain triggering
events. 2' The executive's unfettered right to withdraw deferred
benefits would result in constructive receipt, thereby taxing
him/her as if the payments were actually made, even though
he/she chose not to actually take the money. '
In Rev. Rul. 60-31 discussed earlier, the Service approved of a
variety of triggering events for purposes of accelerating the
payment of deferrals with no adverse tax consequences for the
executive: attainment of a certain age; becoming partially or
totally incapacitated; completion of a certain period of service;
termination of employment; and reduction in hours worked from

123. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-39-031 (June 29,

1987) (permitting the

employer under a rabbi trust agreement discretion as whether to distribute
the executive's benefit in a lump sum or a 10-year installment). This ruling
was later modified by Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-30-069 (May 5, 1988).
124. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (2002).
126. See Non-qualified Plans Discussed by IRS Official, RIA EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION & TAX'N COORDINATOR, Jan. 1996, at 6 (indicating that the
mere existence of certain triggering provisions may cause the executive to
have immediate taxation).
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full-time to part-time. 1 In a series of private letter rulings, the
Service expanded this list of triggering event to include change of
control of the employer;" decrease of employer's net worth below
$10 million; 129 or employer's liquidation.3 °
Under the constructive receipt and economic benefit doctrine,
such arrangement avoids any immediate tax to the executive as
such events are presumed to be outside the control of the
executive. Although an executive's termination of employment or
retirement may very well be within his/her control, the
presumption is that the executive would not terminate his/her
employment simply to trigger payment under the plan. If the
triggering event occurs and payment is required by the employer
to the executive, the executive owes income tax only at the time of
actual receipt of the payments.
The Enron scandal certainly highlights whether the use of
"triggering events" in executive compensation plans should be
modified in the context of an executive who is an insider."' The
actions of certain Enron executives highlight the fallacy of
presuming that an insider would not terminate employment

127. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, modified by Rev. Rul. 64-279,

1964-2 C.B. 121 and Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100.
128. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-08-014 (Nov. 22, 1994) (permitting the
acceleration of benefit payment upon "the voluntary termination of the plan by
a corporate successor"); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-04-012 (Oct. 23, 1991) (describing
plan that provided for the payment of retirement benefits upon participant's
death, total disability or termination of employment resulting from retirement
or change in control); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-46-052 (Aug. 19, 1987) (permitting
payments after an involuntary termination following a change of control);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-18-095 (Jan. 31, 1984) (allowing deferrals to become
immediately payable upon a change of control).
129. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-08-014 (Nov. 22, 1994) (permitting a trigger for
the plan if "the Company's net worth falls below $10,000,000").
130. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-35-031 (May 24, 1984) (authorizing, "[iun the
event that the employer is liquidated, pursuant to a transaction whereby no
successor corporation assumes the assets and liabilities of the Employer, the
entire value of the [deferral] is to be paid to the Employee ... in one lump
sum").
131. See Tech. Adv. Mem.
8828004 (Apr. 12, 1988) (applying the
constructive receipt doctrine in the context of a controlling shareholder).
A taxpayer who is a controlling shareholder ... is in a position to
direct the corporation to do his bidding. He may at anytime modify the
terms of the deferral agreement, accelerate payments, or direct that any
assets held by the corporation to provide funds to pay its obligations
under the agreement be immediately distributed to the employee
(himself). In reality, there is nothing standing between the taxpayer and
the income. It is available at will... Taxpayer here ... possessed the
full power to transfer full ownership of the annuity contract to himself
whenever he wished, to change the investment, or to accelerate
payments under the plan. The deferred amounts were available to him
so that he could have drawn upon them at any time.
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simply to accelerate payment under an executive compensation
plan.
Given their particular inside knowledge about the
employer's actual financial health, losing one's employment was
far more economically preferable to losing all executive deferred
compensation benefits.
Should the employer later become
bankrupt (as was the case with Enron), there is a "look back"
provision under the bankruptcy rules for payments made to
insiders within one year of bankruptcy."'
Normally, the
bankruptcy trustee may recover transfers of property made by the
employer within 90 days of bankruptcy in order to restore the
bankruptcy priority rules. 3' However, in the case of a transfer of
property to an insider (including cash payments), the 90-day
period is extended to one year."' State fraudulent conveyance
laws also support a similar approach, but vary on the time-period
3
used to reach "fraudulent" transfers."
These bankruptcy rules
treat certain payments to executives as preferential transfers, and
therefore, voidable. Such amounts may then become subject to
receivership by the bankruptcy courts. However, to the extent
such distributions were widespread among the insider executives
and already spent by such insiders, the look-back protection is
simply illusory.
In the case of Enron, cash withdrawals from deferred
compensation plans were made to executives in October and
November, 2001, just weeks before Enron's December 2, 2001,
filing for bankruptcy."3 6 Therefore, the bankruptcy courts should
have no problems treating these withdrawals as voidable and
using the proceeds for Enron creditors. It is not clear, however,
whether cash withdrawals from deferred compensation plans were
made in 2000 to Enron executives, which would escape the reach
of the bankruptcy courts.
The Service has ruled that it will not issue an advance ruling
to executive compensation plans using triggering events to

132. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) and 101(58) (2000). For a full discussion of
applicability of the state fraudulent conveyance laws and federal bankruptcy
laws see Denis A. Keleinfeld, Administration of Trusts in Florida, Offshore

Trusts, Fla. Bar Ass'n 2001 at ch.15 (discussing the applicability of the state
fraudulent conveyance laws and federal bankruptcy laws). See also Bank of
Am. N.A. v. Moglia (In re Outboard Marine Corp.), 278 B.R. 778 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (denying any priority interests for rabbi trust beneficiaries in the
context of the employer's bankruptcy).
133. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000).
134. 11 U.S.C. § 101(58) (2000). See id. at § 101(31) (defining "insider").
135. 37 Am. Jr.2d FraudulentConveyances § 1 (1968).

136. See supra note 13 (regarding news reports from the Houston
Chronicle) and http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/chapter 11/faq.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002) (noting the date of December 2, 2001 as the date of filing
for bankruptcy in the twelfth question listed in the Frequency Asked
Questions About Chapter 11 filing).
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137
However, some
accelerate payment for controlling shareholders.
cases and rulings indicate the application of the constructive
receipt doctrine covering controlling shareholders depends upon
the various facts and circumstances. 3 ' None of the case law or
rulings focus on whether the constructive receipt rules should be
modified where the executive is an insider,perhaps assuming that
the securities laws adequately deal with the issue. However, the
securities laws focus on insider trading of company stock and an
employee's investment in employer stock, not necessarily on
executive compensation plans that do not rely upon company stock
While securities law does require
as the underlying asset. 9
disclosure of executive and director compensation for publicly
traded firms, it summarizes the compensation packages for at
most five individuals and does not require the particulars of the
executive deferred compensation packages to be explained. 4 '
In light of the Enron scandal, it is not known whether the
Service will revise the use of triggering events under the
constructive receipt doctrine as providing a "substantial risk of
forfeiture" to avoid current taxation. The Service certainly has the
regulatory authority to treat controlling shareholders and insiders
similarly, as they both are in a position to use their unique
knowledge about the employer for their own financial benefit. If

137. Rev. Proc. 96-3, 1996-1 C.B. 456, 461 § 3(30).
138. Childs v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 634, 654 (1994), affd per curiam 89 F.3d
856 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 178, modified
by Rev. Rul. 64-279, 1964-2 C.B. 121; Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100.
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2000) (referring to potential liabilities for
officers, directors and 10% shareholders under the short swing profit
provisions). While the SEC has refused to issue no-action letters for
nonqualified deferred compensation since 1991, it had issued a number of
favorable no-action letters regarding nonqualified deferred compensation
plans. See Dean Witter Financial Services Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan
SEC No-Action Ltr. (February 4, 1985), St. Paul Companies, Inc. SEC NoAction Ltr. (Feb. 25, 1988), and Wells Fargo & Company SEC No-Action Ltr.
(May 5, 1986). Compare informal SEC comments at http://www.crgworld.com/
transcripts/chat_010718.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2002) (noting its
consideration of revising its historical position due to the changes in the
design of nonqualified plans and the expansion of the number of employees
participating in such plans). See also SEC Release No. 33-6188, reprinted in
Maldonado, Securities Law Aspects of Employee Benefit Plans, 362 TAX
MGM'T (BNA) at B-905, n.21 (Feb. 1, 1980) (requiring registration "only where
a plan is both voluntary and contributory and invests in securities of the
employer an amount greater than that paid into the plan by the employer")
(emphasis in original). Thus, using employer stock as a benchmark to
measure an executive's investment performance would not require registration
of the plan.
140. See SEC Release No. 33-6962, reprinted in Kroll, Deferred
Compensation Arrangements, 385-3rd TAX MGM'T (BNA), at B-1206 (requiring
compensation information for the company's chief executive officer and the
four highest paid individuals for the last completed fiscal year whose salary
and bonus exceed $100,000).
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the determination of the constructive receipt doctrine in such
contexts is dependent upon the facts and circumstances, this
approach becomes difficult to administer. However, the Service
could require that plans covering such individuals apply for an
advance letter ruling; thereby conditioning the triggering events
on certain criteria unique to the employer. Alternatively, Congress
could simply mandate that certain triggering events (e.g.,
termination of employment, voluntary retirement, reduction from
full-time employment to part-time employment) are simply not
available to controlling shareholders and/or insiders as voluntary
triggering events.
WITHDRAWALS,

How MUCH: An alternative design to provide

greater security to executives is to permit unlimited withdrawal
rights for the executive under the deferred compensation plan but
impose a substantial forfeiture upon the exercise of such
withdrawal rights. Such penalties are commonly referred to as
"hair cut" provisions (e.g., loss of 10% in one's account balance or
suspension of future participation if a voluntary withdrawal is
made). 4' The Service has issued some guidance in this area, but
its rulings were confined to qualified plans. Before 1982, deferrals
for participants under qualified plans were subject to the
constructive receipt doctrine.'
The Service routinely approved
letter ruling requests for qualified plans that imposed a penalty
(e.g., 5%, 6% or 10%)"'" or imposed a participation suspension, in
141. See generally Rev. Rul. 55-423, 1955-1 C.B. 41; Rev. Rul. 80-157,
1980-1 C.B. 186.

142. See 26 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2000) (amending it to limit taxation to
.amount[s] actually distributed"); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-1(a)-(1) (2002)
prior to the amendments made by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
("ERTA"), Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
143. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-47-052 (Aug. 21, 1984) (affirming the use of a
6% penalty); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-41-017 (July 9, 1982) (affirming the use
of a 5% penalty combined with a 12-month suspension from plan
participation); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-23-097 (May 12, 1981) (affirming the use of a
6% penalty); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-07-013 (Nov. 1980) (affirming the use of a 6%
.offset amount" in instances when the value being withdrawn exceeded
participant's tax basis); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-37-056 (June 18, 1980) (affirming
the use of a 6% penalty); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-26-043 (Apr. 2, 1980) (affirming the

use of a 6% penalty); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-20-145 (Feb. 26, 1980) (using a 10%
forfeiture penalty for withdrawals); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-10-076 (Dec. 13, 1979)
(affirming the use of a 6% penalty); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-09-067 (Dec. 6, 1979)
(affirming the use of a 6% penalty); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-25-108 (Mar. 23, 1979)
(affirming the use of a 6% penalty); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-35-060 (May 31, 1978)
(using the greater of 6% or $50 forfeiture penalty for withdrawals); Priv. Ltr.

Rul. 78-19-021 (Feb. 8, 1978) (using a 6% forfeiture penalty for withdrawals).
But see Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (2002) (approving a penalty of 25% as a
significant limitation for constructive receipt purposes).

See Jennifer Roof,

Hair Cut Plans: A Viable Means for Executive Compensation Planning?,5 J.

DEFERRED CoMP. 2, 20 (2000) (discussing the use of hair cut provisions in
nonqualified deferred compensation plans).
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the event of a participant's voluntary withdrawal."' Nonqualified
executive deferred compensation plans have adopted similar rules
to avoid constructive receipt for executives who make premature
withdrawals from those plans. Accordingly, executives' deferred
compensation plans have been designed to give executives the
right to withdraw any or all of their accrued benefit or account
balance, provided that they forfeit a given percentage of those
benefits and/or be suspended145 from future participation under the
plan for some period of time.
The Service has not explicitly authorized the use of hair cuts
in an executive deferred compensation plan and will not issue an
advance private letter ruling for an underlying trust funding such
plan as such terms deviate from the exact language of their model
trust.'46 If litigated, the question for the court is whether a
forfeiture of a given percentage and/or suspension from future
participation for a fixed period of time is an adequate "substantial
limitation or restriction" to avoid the application of constructive
receipt. Certainly an argument can be made that a 10% financial
penalty may be a sufficient limitation as Congress has affirmed
the use of a 10% premature tax penalty to dissuade early
distributions from qualified plans.'
In the context of the Enron scandal, it appears that the
underlying executive compensation plan used a hair cut penalty of
'
10% to permit premature withdrawals by its executives. 48

144. See Rev. 58-230, 1958-1 C.B. 204 and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-37-056 (June
18, 1980) (approving a six-month suspension) and Rev. Rul. 77-34, 1977-1 C.B.

276 (approving a 12-month suspension). The ABA Section of Taxation,
Employee Benefits Committee, has recommended that the executive's right to
withdraw benefits does not result in immediate constructive receipt if the
withdrawal results in a financial penalty, suspension from participation in

future deferrals for one year, or a combination of the two. See A.B.A. Sec.
Tax'n, Committee on Employee Benefits, Report on the Proposed Restatement of
the Service's ProceduralGuidance for the Issuance of Advance Rulings on the
Application of the Doctrine of Constructive Receipt to Nonqualified Deferred
CompensationArrangements, 50 TAX LAW. 217, 233 (1996).
145. William L. MacDonald, Giving Your Rabbi Trust a "Haircut," AM.
MGMT. ASW'N'S COMP. & BENEFITs REV. (May-June 1993), available at http://

www.rabbitrust.com/AMAarticle.html. (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
146. See § 4, Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422 (providing that a "request
for a ruling must be accompanied by a representation that the trust conforms
to the model trust language contained in this revenue procedure, including the
order in which sections of the model trust language appear, and that the trust
adopted does not contain any inconsistent language, in substituted portions or
elsewhere, that conflicts with the model trust language").
147. See the legislative history regarding I.R.C. § 72(t) (2000), at H.R.
Rep. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1974) (noting that 10% would "be a
substantial deterrent to prevent an owner-employee from treating his

retirement plan as a tax-free savings account from which he can withdraw
prior to retirement").
148. See supra note 13 (regarding news reports from the Houston
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Certainly hair cut penalties of 5% to 10% would be nominal
forfeitures in light of a pending bankruptcy or insolvency where
the executive stands to lose 100% of benefits due to creditors'
preferences. While the bankruptcy courts may be able to reclaim
some or all of these amounts, cash has been diverted from the
company at the very time it was most needed. Due to the
legislative moratorium, the Service may be unable to rule
adversely on the use of hair cut penalties in executive
compensation plans; however, requiring such plans which cover
controlling shareholders and/or insiders to apply in advance for a
ruling would provide an opportunity to review the actual penalties
proposed under the plan. The author certainly recommends the
use of a higher threshold penalty for controlling shareholders
and/or insiders in order to make the forfeiture more meaningful.
Adding Another Layer of Security: Securing the Assets
(Rabbi Trusts)
While the above rules provide greater access for executives to
monies under executive deferred compensation plans, they do not
protect the executive from other risks: (1) the employer's later
"change of heart" (employer's refusal to pay benefits in bad faith or
without cause); (2) the risk of later "cash flow" problems for the
employer; (3) a change of control or potential change of control
(announcement of a take-over bid) by a new employer, or (4) a
change in the employer's financial condition. Executives have
sought ways of "securing" against some or all of these risks
without triggering adverse income tax consequences. Such security
provisions must attempt to avoid the property rules of I.R.C.
section 83 and the rules of I.R.C. section 402(b) governing
employer contributions to non-exempt trusts.
The first Service private letter ruling addressing this issue
provided assurances against the employer's later "change of
heart," in the context of a trust established for a rabbi by his
congregation. 149 The Service approved of the congregation's use of
a trust for its rabbi (thereafter coined the "rabbi trust"), whereby
employer assets could be set aside or segregated for the express

Chronicle).
149. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-13-107 (Dec. 31, 1980) (concluding that because
the assets of the subject trust remained susceptible to creditors' claims and
were not paid or made available to the rabbi, the funding of the trust would
not be a taxable event to the rabbi). See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,230 (May
7, 1984) (permitting individual accounts to be established for the participants
of the executive compensation plan under the terms of a trust, held by an
unrelated bank, where the trust remained subject to the claims of creditors).
Thereafter, the Service suspended rulings on rabbi trusts as it and the DOL
were studying the issue of as what constitutes "funding" for ERISA and Code
purposes.
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purpose of satisfying its obligations under the executive deferred
compensation plan, securing that the monies would be there when
promised. However, the assets in the rabbi trust had to be
available to the employer's creditors in the event of bankruptcy or
insolvency; if such creditors' preferences were not given, the rabbi
had a secured promise to pay from the employer, thereby resulting
in immediate taxation.5 0 For tax purposes, the rabbi trust is
treated as an employer grantor trust, whereby income, losses, and
deductions flow back to the employer.'
Under the constructive receipt rules, the executive's right to
receive payments from the rabbi trust is subject to a substantial
forfeiture risk as they are subordinate to the claims of the
employer's creditors in the event of bankruptcy or insolvency.
While the underlying assets of the rabbi trust would be regarded
as property for §§ 83 and 402(b) purposes and under the economic
benefit doctrine, there is no immediate taxation to the executive as
his/her rights are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
Modifying the executive's right by allowing the executive the right
to assign or transfer any assets under the rabbi trust would then
"fund" the plan for Section § 83 purposes, resulting in immediate
taxation.
The Service suspended the issuance of rulings on rabbi trusts
during the mid-1980s while the DOL was studying the issue as to
whether the use of such trusts caused the underlying executive
compensation plan to be "funded" for ERISA purposes. After the
DOL ruled that the use of a rabbi trust would not cause the plan to
be funded for ERISA purposes, the Service resumed its rulings." 2
Due to the popularity of rabbi trusts, the Service issued a model
rabbi trust in 1992, which was intended to serve as a safe harbor
for employers utilizing trusts as a means of securing the promises
under its executive compensation plans." 3 The model language
sets forth mandated, alternative, and optional provisions."
Under
150. Id. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-18-105 (Jan. 31, 1984) (determining

that an interest in the subject deferred compensation arrangement did not
constitute property for the purposes of § 83 because trust estate assets were
not set aside from claims of the corporation's creditors), and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-

09-023 (Nov. 28, 1984) (approving the use of bank or escrow accounts in lieu of
irrevocable trusts).
151. I.R.C. §§ 671-77 (2000).
152. See DOL Adv. Op. 91-16A, supra note 51.

153. See § 3 of Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422 (indicating that the
model trust "is intended to serve as a safe harbor for taxpayers that adopt and
maintain grantor trusts in connection with unfunded deferred compensation
arrangements. If the model trust is used in accordance with this Revenue
Procedure, an employee will not be in constructive receipt of income or incur
an economic benefit solely on account of the adoption or maintenance of the

trust. However, the desired tax effect will be achieved only if the nonqualified
deferred compensation arrangement effectively defers compensation").
154. Id. at § 5.

The John Marshall Law Review

[35:487

the terms of the revenue procedure, an independent third-party
corporate trustee must be used; the trust may be revocable or
irrevocable; and the trust may require annual employer
contributions.
The Service will provide exceptions to the
provisions of such safe harbor or its5 5alternate trust provisions only
in rare and unusual circumstances.
In lieu of using a rabbi trust for additional security,
executives have relied upon third-party guarantees to make the
promised payments in the event of the employer's bankruptcy or
insolvency. 1 6 While executives have used surety bonds,157 letters of
credit,"' and indemnity insurance," 9 shadow trusts, agency
agreements, and escrow arrangements;"n and secular trusts; 6' the
62
most popular security device, however, remains the rabbi trust.

155. Id. at § 3 (stating that "rulings will not be issued on unfunded
deferred compensation arrangements that use a trust other than the model
trust, except in rare and unusual circumstances").
156. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-56, 2000-2 C.B. 393 (noting that a parent
corporation may guarantee its subsidiary's obligation under an executive
deferred compensation plan without any adverse tax consequences to the
executives as the unfunded and unsecured promise is now simply a promise
made by two entities instead of one).
157. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-06-012 (Nov. 3, 1983) (permitting the
employee's purchase of a surety bond with an independent insurer to pay the
unfunded and unsecured nonqualified deferrals in the event of the employer's
default without conferring any economic benefit on the employee). In studying
the applicability of the economic benefit doctrine, a third party's guarantee of
the employer's promise could be an economic benefit to the employee if such
guarantee were purchased by the employer, instead of the employee (as was
the case under the ruling). While the employee's purchase of the surety bond
provides greater security to the executive, it is not flowing from the employer
and thus there were no adverse tax consequences. In 1986, the IRS suspended
rulings on surety bonds in order to study the issue, but lifted the suspension in
1993 with another private letter ruling. Under Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-44-038 (Aug.
2, 1993), the Service approved of certain executives' purchase of insurance to
guarantee the employer's promise under the deferred compensation plan, even
though the plan was funded with a rabbi trust. Since the Service found no
involvement by the employer in the purchase of such insurance, there were no
adverse tax consequences for the executives due to the insurance. Despite the
Service's favorable ruling, surety bonds have little practical importance today
due to the unavailability of such insurance vehicles.
158. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9443006 (Apr. 29, 1994) (employer's purchase of
a letter of credit secured by its general assets to assure the payment of
vacation pay was property under I.R.C. § 83 for the employees who were the
beneficiaries under the letter of credit).
159. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-44-038 (Nov. 5, 1993) (affirming that the
employee's purchase of indemnification insurance with an independent
insurer to pay the nonqualified deferrals in the event the employer was unable
to do so did not result in any economic benefit to the employee).
160. These arrangements may permit the employer to retain investment
control over the assets even though a third party holds the assets for the
benefits of the executives.
161. See Rev. Proc. 92-64, § 3, supra note 146.
162. See, e.g., the results of the Clark Bardes Consulting - Compensation
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Employers have also utilized a variety of non-cash methods to
provide some security to executives under the rabbi trust prior to
the triggering event, including use of employer stock 163 and use of a
warrant to issue employer stock.1 " Such methods may prove to be
costly and cumbersome, and may raise corporate law and
securities issues. 6'
As there is no requirement that the rabbi trust be irrevocable
nor that a minimum level of assets be maintained, employers do
not have to fund the trust at its inception. The assets are not
provided the same tax benefits as assets under qualified
retirement plans (which accumulate tax-free until distribution).
Instead, the rabbi trust is treated as an employer asset and
therefore, its assets are taxed to the employer as earned at the
corporate tax rates (unless invested in tax-exempt vehicles). 6
Benefits are then paid to the executives when due under the
deferred compensation plan and taxed at the time of receipt,
unless used for the benefit of the employer's creditors in the event
of bankruptcy or insolvency.
While some rabbi trusts may not require advance funding of
the deferrals, the underlying plan may attempt to mirror the
employer's section 401(k) plan and provide a variety of investment
options to the executives to ascertain future investment
performance. As long as the executive has no economic or property
interests in such investments, the executive's right to direct
investments under the executive compensation167 plan does not
result in any taxable economic benefit to him/her.
Resource Group's 2000 Executive Benefit Survey (noting that 83% of
respondents indicated that their executive compensation plans used some
security device, the rabbi trust being the most common), available at
http://www.clarkbardes.com/crg/knowledgecenter/protected/executivebenefits
surveys/2000benefitsurvey.pdf. (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
163. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-35-006 (Aug. 28, 1992) (permitting rabbi trusts
to use employer stock); see also Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422 (allowing
rabbi assets to be invested in "securities (including stock or rights to acquire

stock) or obligations issued by the company"); I.R.S. Notice 2000-56, 2000-2
C.B. 393 (providing guidance when a parent corporation contributes stock to
the rabbi trust for its subsidiary's employees).
164. See James S. Hutchinson & Michael L. Stevens, Securing the Rabbi
Trust Promise: Issuing a Warrant to Purchase Employer Stock, 5 J. OF
DEFERRED COMP. 3, 11 (2000).
165. Id. at 16-17. See also A. Richard Susko & Alan Wilmit, Use of StockBased Rabbi Trusts as Feeder Entities for Various Employee Benefit Plans,

339 PLI/TAx 129 (1993) (discussing rabbi trusts holding employer stock and
concluding that whether a "rabbi trust holding employer stock will be subject
to registration under the Securities Act will depend on an analysis of the
particular plan at issue" and that "the presence of a rabbi trust generally
should not affect the question of whether interests in the plan will be subject
to registration").
166. I.R.C. §§ 671-677 (2000).
167. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-05-012 (Feb. 3, 1995) (holding that a
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Offshore Rabbi Trusts

Under the IRS's model rabbi trust, the trust is required to be
valid under state law and all of the substantive terms of the trust,
including the creditors' rights clause, must be enforceable under
state law.1 68 Thus if the assets of a rabbi trust are established or
moved offshore (i.e., outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts), the
executives cannot rely on the protection of the Service's revenue
procedure. However, moving the trust offshore provides an
additional layer of asset security for the executive. 69 The use of an
offshore rabbi trust, especially in a jurisdiction with strict asset
protection laws, makes it far more difficult and costly for the
employer's creditors to 17 collect such assets in the event of
bankruptcy or insolvency. 1
While the Service has indicated informally that use of an
offshore rabbi trust may subject the executive deferred
compensation plan to taxation, it has yet to provide any formal
guidance. 17'

Given the ambiguity, some employers have been

testing the waters in establishing such offshore trusts. While
Congress' initial response to the use of offshore rabbi trusts may
have been tempered, as rumors surface regarding the payment of
bonuses to Enron executives that were then sheltered offshore to
circumvent attachment,
Congress is now focusing attention on
1 72
such offshore trusts.

Security through the Use of a Secular Trust

Full security for the executive may be achieved by means of a
"secular trust," which protects the executive, even against the risk
of employer bankruptcy or insolvency. 73 The secular trust is an
participant's right to designate investments under a trust established for the
executive compensation plan did not trigger an economic benefit).
168. See Rev. Proc. 92-64 § 4 supra note 147.
169. See Michael P. Corry, Time to Assess Your Company's Nonqualified
Plans?,7 J. TAX'N EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 77 (1999) (noting that the benefit of an

offshore trust "lies in its asset protection abilities." The trustees of such trusts
may not have the power to revoke the trust or distribute assets to credits.).
170. See Gerald Nowotny, The Use of Rastafarian Rabbi Trusts in

Securing Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation and Executive Benefits, 2 J.
OF ASSET PROTECTION 6, at 41, July-Aug. 1997; Henry Ordower, A Theorem
for Compensation Deferral: Doubling Your Blessings By Taking Your Rabbi
Abroad, 47 TAX LAWYER 301 (Winter 1994).

171. See AALU Wash. Rep. Bull. 93-102 (Dec. 7, 1993) (reporting that the
Service would no longer rule on rabbi trusts established in foreign countries or
by foreign employers).
172. See U.S. Senate to Take Up Pension Reform, July 11, 2002, available

at http://www.forbes.com/newswire/2002/07/11/rtr658131.html (last visited
Sept. 7, 2002). (reporting that the Senate Finance Committee's proposed
legislation would eliminate tax benefits under executive deferred
compensation plans that were placed in offshore accounts).
173. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-43-021 (July 29, 1988) (affirming the use of an
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irrevocable trust, established and funded to provide the executive
with exclusive rights under the trust. Such trust is funded for tax

purposes as it clearly protects the executive against the risk of the
employer's bankruptcy or insolvency. Thus, the executive is taxed
immediately on the amounts contributed to the trust each year,
and due to the application of I.R.C. section 402(b), on any increase
in the executive's "vested accrued benefit" which may include a
portion of the trust income and unrealized appreciation.1 4 Such
trust is not exempt from tax under I.R.C. section 501(a) as the
underlying executive deferred compensation plan is not a qualified
plan under I.R.C. section 401(a). 75
Due to the adverse tax consequences for the executive, using a
secular trust to "fund" the underlying executive compensation plan
does not provide for any deferral of taxation of such income. Thus,
their attractiveness was better understood when corporate tax
rates exceeded individual income tax rates (which was the case
prior to the adoption of OBRA '93). Then the tax saved by the
employer's deduction for contributions made to the secular trust
exceeded the income tax paid by the executive. If the executive's
pay was grossed-up for the amount of the tax due, there was no
downside for the executive. Now that the maximum individual
income tax rates (ranging from 15% to 39.1%)176 exceed the
maximum corporate tax rates (ranging from 15% to 36%),177 the
secular trust is less appealing from a tax vantage point. The
Service will issue favorable rulings regarding secular trusts, but
has yet to issue a model secular trust document."' Use of secular
irrevocable trust in which neither the employer nor its creditors have an
interest); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-41-023 (July 9, 1988). The term "secular trust" has
no technical definition, but is used by practitioners to contrast these trusts
from rabbi trusts. See also Michael G. Goldstein & J. Kwiatek, The Secular
Trust, 45 J. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF CLU & CHFC 68-73 (Sept. 1991); Michael G.
Goldstein, The Secular Trust Revisited, 47 J. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF CLU &
CHFC, 54-56 (Mar. 1993).
174. Id.

175. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-06-009 (Jan. 7, 1992) (referencing I.R.C. §
402(b)(2)(A), which states the rule that if a reason a trust is not tax-exempt
under § 501(a) is due to its failure to meet the requirements of § 401(a)(26) (or

§ 410(b)), then an employee will have taxable income equal to his/her vested
accrued benefit at year's end); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-07-010 (Feb. 14, 1992)

(denying grantor trust treatment for employer secular trusts, but instead
taxing the trust on its income under I.R.C. § 641, and if such income stayed
within the trust, subjecting the income to double taxation, at the trust's level
and at the executive's level).
176. See I.R.C. § 1(b) (2000), as amended by The Economic Growth & Tax

Recovery Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA"), see Pub. L. No. 107-16 (reducing the
individual income tax rate from 39.6% to 38.6% for 2002-03, to 37.6% for 200405, and to 35% for 2006-10).
177. I.R.C. §§ 11, 1201 (2000).
178. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-31-031 (May 8, 1990) (approving a trust agreement

under which company contributions are includible in the executive's gross
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trusts may cause some problems under ERISA whose exemptions
apply only to unfunded excess benefits or top hat plans. However,
it is possible to structure the secular trust as an "employee grantor
trust" whereby the executives are treated as the owners of the
trust under I.R.C. section 677.' 79 As ERISA requires the employee
plans to be established or maintained by the employer, not the
employees, it may be argued that such arrangements are not even
plans for ERISA purposes.
Hybrids Security Arrangements - RabbicularTrust
There are a variety of hybrid funding vehicles being marketed
today that attempt to combine the best of the rabbi trust and the
secular trust, in hopes of providing greater security for the
executive without any immediate tax consequences. Once such
vehicle is known as the Rabbicular Trust, melding the names of
the rabbi and secular trusts together. 8 ' It is described as a rabbi
trust with no resulting tax consequences to the executive, as the
underlying plan and trust are subject to the claims of the
employer's creditors. Assets may be contributed to the rabbi trust
either at its inception or upon the occurrence of a later triggering
event. However, once a certain triggering event (e.g., change of
income in the year contributed, and deductible by the company in the year
contributed - where benefits payable are reasonable in amount); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 88-43-021 (July 29, 1988) (treating each participant as a grantor-owner
and requiring that the participant include all income, deductions, and credits
of the trust in computing taxable income); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-41-023 (Jul. 9,
1988) (same).
179. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-48-014 (Sept. 22, 1995) (noting the general rule
that under I.R.C. § 671, a grantor deemed the owner of a trust must include,
in computing taxable income and credits, those items of income, deduction,
and credits against tax attributable to the trust); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-48015 (Aug. 29, 1995) (stating that under I.R.C. § 677, a grantor will be treated
as owner of a trust "whose income without the approval or consent of any
adverse party is, or, in direction of the grantor or a non-adverse party, or both
may be (1) distributed to the grantor or the grantor's spouse, or (2) held or
accumulated for future distributions to the grantor or the grantor's spouse");
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-37-011 (Sept. 16, 1994) (treating participant as owner of
trust because "the entire income of the [tirust will be distributed to or held or
accumulated for future distribution to [plarticipant, the grantor, without
approval or consent of any other party"); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9337016 (Jun. 18,
1993) (treating employee as grantor of trust); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-16-018 (Jan.
22, 1993) (same); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-16-008 (Jan. 14, 1993) (requiring grantorparticipant to include all income, deductions and credits of the trust in
computing participant's taxable income); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-43-034 (July 24,
1992) (same); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-35-044 (Jun. 2, 1992) (same); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
88-43-021 (Jul. 29, 1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-41-023 (Jul. 9, 1988) (same).
180. The term "Rabbicular Trust" is a servicemark of Michael G.
Goldstein, J.D., LL.M., St. Louis, Missouri, 1994. See Michael Goldstein,
Michael Swirnoff, & William Drennan, Taxation and Fundingof Nonqualified
Deferred Compensation; M. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., ABA REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE
AND TRUST LAW SECTION (ABA) (1998).
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control) has occurred, the rabbi trust is designed to terminate and
to distribute its assets into individual secular trusts for the
various executives (which are then protected from the employer's
general creditors).'
Such distributions from the rabbi trust would
be subject to the bankruptcy rules as discussed earlier, but if
accomplished before 90 days for non-insiders or one year for
insiders, would remain assets of the executive.
If the rabbi trust is not funded at original inception, it may
require the "funding" with assets upon the occurrence of a
triggering event (e.g., change of control).182
Such trusts are
commonly known as "springing trusts," as the trust becomes
"funded" once the triggering event occurs. The Service has
explicitly approved of the use of a "change of control" as 81a3
triggering event for funding in its model rabbi trust document,
but has not issued any private letter rulings affirming their use.
Other triggering events that are often used in funding rabbi trusts
include the "potential change in control" (i.e., announcement of a
take-over bid) or "change of heart" (i.e., employer's refusal to pay
benefits under the plan in bad faith or without cause).
If the triggering event is limited to a change in control or a
change of heart, it is arguable that there should be no adverse
consequence to the executive as the IRS's model rabbi trust
document permits such a triggering event to fund the rabbi trust
and make such funding irrevocable. In addition, the constructive
receipt rules do not tax the executive simply because the executive
obtains the right to withdraw monies from the plan upon a change
of control. Alternatively, the Service may determine that the rabbi
trust was never intended to be subject to the claims of the
employer's creditors, despite the document's terms to the contrary,
when viewed in conjunction with the secular trusts that are to be
maintained for the sole benefit of the executives."
Under this
argument, if the rabbi trust was never intended to effectively
protect the employer's creditors, it would not protect the
executives from current taxation.
If the triggering event under the rabbi trust is tied to the
employer's
financial
health
or
its
impending
bankruptcy/insolvency, 8 ' the Service would undoubtedly hold the
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
§ 10.21 of Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. at 424, § 1(b).
Id. § 5.02, Sec. I, (f).
See BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolio, Deferred CompensationArrangements

A-56 (discussing secular trusts).
185. See Michael G. Goldstein and William A. Drennan, RabbicularTrust
Will Withstand IRS Scrutiny; Creator Counters Criticism, 4 J. TAX'N
EMPLOYEE BEN. 41 (May/June 1996) (noting that an IRS Official reported that
the Rabbicular Trust was a "failed attempt to find the Holy Grail"); Michael G.
Goldstein, Current Developments in Executive Benefit Security: The Next

Generation- The RabbicularTrust, ALI-ABA Uses of Insurance in Estate and
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executive in constructive receipt of the deferrals as he/she is no
longer subject to substantial risk of loss. In light of the Enron
scandal, the use of triggering events to fund the rabbi trust and
distribute all benefits into secular trusts may be particularly
problematic in the context of a controlling shareholder and/or
insider who made have inside knowledge regarding the employer's
financial health and/or responsible for the employer's financial
problems. Such funding could obviously be to the detriment of the
employer clearly at a time when the monies are most needed for
the business.
Hybrid FundingArrangements - Vesting Trust
Another vehicle, known as the vesting trust, is structured to
pay benefits to the executive only if certain triggering events occur
(e.g., termination of employment, attainment of a specified
retirement age, change of control), as opposed to using the
triggering events to accelerate the payment of benefits. The
vesting trust need not be subject to the claims of the employer's
creditors, provided the executive's rights under the trust are
nontransferable and are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
Proponents of the trust argue that constructive receipt does not
apply until the occurrence of the triggering event, as such events
impose a substantial limitation on the receipt of benefits. If none
of the triggering events occur, the trust monies revert back to the
employer, and the executive, if still owed money under an
executive deferred compensation arrangement, would be paid
directly from the employer's general assets. While the Service has
not formally ruled on such an arrangement, it may be regarded as
a funded arrangement, and therefore taxable to the executive.11
Hybrid FundingArrangements - Secured Trust
A vehicle known as the secured trust 187 has been described as
a trust that protects executive deferred compensation plans even
in the event of an employer's bankruptcy or insolvency-the
ultimate in security protection. This trust is structured so as to
provide benefits to the executive only if the employer goes

Tax Planning (Oct. 25, 1995) (suggesting the use of the following triggers in a
rabbicular trust: "particular financial events (e.g., if the employer's net worth

falls below $X; if the employer's gross sales fall below $X, etc.); financial ratios
(earnings per share falls below X; debt to equity ratio falls below X, etc.); the
loss of certain key customers with billings in excess of $X; catastrophic
litigation or environmental liabilities, etc.; or a change in control of the
company (signaled by a sale, exchange or other transfer of a certain
percentage of the employer's stock to outsiders within a one-year period").
186. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-39-031, supra note 123.
187. This trust is proprietary to Compensation Resource Group, Inc.,
available at http://www.clarkbardes.com/crg (last visited Apr. 13, 2002).
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bankrupt or has a change of control, and thus is not subject to the
claims of the employer's creditors. If the executive terminates
employment prior to these triggering events, his/her benefits are
forfeited under the trust and the monies revert back to the
employer. The employer is regarded as a contingent beneficiary
under the secured trust, as it may receive the monies in the event
of the executive's termination of employment."'
Unlike the vesting trust, the secured trust pays the executive
only if the employer goes bankrupt or insolvent. If the employer
goes bankrupt before the executive terminates employment, the
secured trust pays the benefits to the executives, as it is not
subject to the claims of the creditors. However, if the employer is
financially healthy at the time of the executive's termination, it
simply pays the executive its deferred compensation out of its
general assets and the assets of the secured trust revert back to
the employer. The executive is certainly at risk that the employer
may have a "change of heart" at the time of termination, as he/she
will be then relying on the employer's general assets for payment.
Proponents of this arrangement argue that the executive has no
constructive receipt in the secured trust because they are subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture (i.e., as benefits are payable only
if the employer goes bankrupt or has a change of control).'89 The
Service has not issued any formal guidance regarding the use of
such trusts.
Hybrid FundingArrangements - The Heavenly Trust
Another trust arrangement being proposed is known as the
heavenly trust" (i.e., obviously named as it was too good to be
true). Such trust actually refers to the combined use of two trusts
- a rabbi trust where assets have actually been set aside for
executive deferred benefits but subject to the claims of creditors
and a secured trust that is established to pay benefits only in the
event of the employer's insolvency or bankruptcy. Proponents of
the device argue that the use of the rabbi trust poses no
constructive receipt issues to the executive (as benefits are subject
to the claims of creditors), and that the use of the secured trust
poses no economic interest or property issues (as benefits are
payable only in the event of the employer's bankruptcy or
insolvency). Clearly viewed as a single unit, the executive is
188. See

transcript

of

live

chat

with

William

MacDonald

at

http://www.crgworld.com/transcripts/chat-010718.html (last visited Apr. 13,
2002) (noting that the secured trust is set up as a rabbi trust with no
immediate taxation to the executive, but acts like a secular trust in providing

protection against bankruptcy and insolvency).
189. Id.
190. See HENRY SMITH ET AL., NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION
ANSWER BOOK, 5:6 at 5-4 (3d ed. 1996).
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guaranteed payment of the deferred benefits and protected against
the claims of the employer's creditors, which defeats the intent of
the constructive receipt doctrine.
The Service has yet to rule on the use of a heavenly trust;
thus, employers relying on such trusts would certainly be advised
to seek an opinion letter from counsel. The secured trust used
alone (without a tandem rabbi trust) subjects the executive to the
risk that the employer could have a change of heart. However, for
a financially healthy employer, this may not be much of a threat
as the executives could certainly sue the employer and enforce
their rights under the plans. Certainly the use of a secured trust
in tandem with a rabbi trust containing assets actually set aside
(the so-called heavenly trust) eliminates any risk for the executive,
and as such would likely be viewed together by the Service. As
there is no risk to the executive, he/she has a secured right to the
benefits and therefore would be currently taxable.
Given the Service's limitations on its interpretation of the
constructive receipt doctrine; the courts' liberal interpretation of
various aspects of the constructive receipt doctrine; and its
continual focus on qualified plans, as opposed to nonqualified
plans, it is easy to understand the Service's natural reluctance to
aggressively pursue the use of these trusts. However, such lack of
formal guidance on a number of key issues has resulted in a
potpourri of devices and trusts being used in conjunction with
executive deferred compensation plans. Without specific guidance
from the Service, an atmosphere of uncertainty has developed
prompting certain individuals to "test the waters." Now that the
Enron scandal has opened our eyes as to the consequences that
these plans have for the employer's creditors (which may also
include participants under the employer's qualified employee
profit sharing plan), the protections afforded to executives,
especially insiders, should be reexamined and restricted. ERISA's
explicit intent was to protect the assets of qualified pension plans
for participants and beneficiaries, affording nonqualified plans
with substantially less protective rules.
Legislative Proposals
As the various Senate and House Committees are studying
the Enron situation, a variety of different legislative proposals are
being considered, both at the qualified plan and executive
compensation plan levels. As of the end of July 2002, for example,
over 15 legislative proposals have been advanced by Members of
Congress. 9' The Bush Administration advanced its own proposal

191. Profit Sharing401(k) Council of America, Legislation Affecting
Company Stock, Apr. 16, 2002, available at http://www.psca.org/
wash/pdf/compstockleg.pdf.
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as well.192 Despite the number of proposals advanced in Congress
or by President Bush, a number of the bills contain identical
Thus, three proposals, H.R.
language, or similar provisions.
3762,"'3 S. 1992,'9 and a substitute to S. 1971 titled The National
Employee Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act (the
"Chairman's Mark"),'95 have emerged as the leading pieces of
legislation seeking to remedy corporate fraud and abuses
especially in the area of pension plans holding employer stock.
Congressman John Boehner (R-OH) introduced H.R. 3762,
which includes two stand-alone bills each introduced in response
to the Enron bankruptcy. The House passed H.R. 3762 on April
11, 2002 by a 255 - 163 vote,' and subsequently reported to the
Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pension (HELP) Committee
on April 15, 2002.29' Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) introduced
S. 1992, which was favorably reported out of the Senate HELP
Committee and contains similar provisions provided for in H.R.
3762. Finally, the Chairman's Mark, introduced by Senator Max
Baucus (D-MT), Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee,
contains identical language provided for in S. 1992 and legislative
language pertaining to investment education that was previously
introduced by Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) as a stand alone
bill.9 The Senate Finance Committee unanimously approved the
Chairman's Mark on July 11, 2002.
While all three proposals deal with substantive changes for
qualified pension and profit sharing plans with participant
directed investments in employer stock, only the Chairman's Mark
proposal specifically addresses executive compensation plans.
Under this proposal, the 1978 moratorium imposed on the
Service's issuance of constructive receipt guidance would be lifted
and the Service would be directed to issue new guidance for
executive compensation plans, particularly in those areas that
These areas include various
Congress considers abusive.
withdrawal provisions and haircut penalties being used under

192. Specifics on the President's Plan to Strengthen Retirement Security,
THE WHITE HOUSE, Feb. 28, 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2002/02/20020228-1.html.
193. Pension Security Act of 2002, H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. (2002) ("H.R.
3762").
194. Protecting America's Pensions Act of 2002, S. 1992, 107th Cong.
(2002) ("S. 1992").
195. The National Employee Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act,
107th Cong. (2002) (the "Chairman's Mark").
196. H.R. 3762, Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl07:HRO3762:@@@L&summ2=m&

(last visited Aug. 20, 2002).
197. Id.
198. Independent Investment Advice Act of 2001, S. 1677, 107th Cong.
(2002).
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executive deferred compensation plans. In addition, the proposal
instructs the Service to address those situations in which the
deferred compensation plan assets are in form subject to the
claims of the employer's general creditors, but in substance are not
reachable by the creditors.1 99 The proposal also renders amounts
deferred under plans that are funded through the use of offshore
trusts as taxable income, thereby circumventing the use of
offshore trusts.0 0 Clearly the proposal is addressing the abuses
that have been surfaced in the context of executive deferred
compensation plans, as opposed to forging new policy changes for
such plans.
Whether any of these proposals will pass a majority of both
the House of Representatives and the Senate remains unclear.
Moreover, dependent upon the final agreement of the provisions, it
remains unclear as to whether President Bush will sign the
measure into law. To be sure, in the wake Enron, Worldcom,
Xerox, and Merck accounting abuses, the American public is
clamoring for both Congress and the President to combat corporate
fraud and abuse and strengthen retirement security. With H.R.
3762 already passed in the House, all eyes are on the Senate.
Even if the Senate passes either S. 1992 or the Chairman's Mark,
both the Senate-passed proposal and H.R. 3762 must go to
conference where Members of both Chambers must work to
reconcile the differences between the bills. All in all, however,
with the November elections quickly approaching, it is likely that
some type of retirement security legislation will make it to the
President's desk.
Conclusion
The demise of the Studebaker-Packard company almost thirty
years ago left thousands of retirees with insufficiently funded
retirement benefits; Congress responded to the public outcry be
enacting ERISA. °1
Such legislation was designed to impose
substantive regulations on retirement and profit sharing plans,
including funding and fiduciary obligations. Other types of
employee benefit plans, including welfare benefit and executive
compensation plans, were subject to various reporting and
disclosure requirements, as well as ERISA's enforcement
provisions. At that time, little thought was given to executive
199. See Description of the Chairman's Modifications to the "National

Employee Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act," THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON TAX'N, July 11, 2002 at 36-38.

200. Id. at 39-41.
201. For an extensive background of the history of ERISA, see James A.
Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failurein the Business": The StudebakerPackard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFFALO L. REV. 683

(2001).
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deferred compensation plans that account for the various
exemptions afforded by ERISA for such plans.
Today, the dramatic investment loss suffered by Enron
participants, whose qualified profit sharing accounts were
invested in Enron stock, has prompted Congress to respond.
Legislative proposals now under consideration all require varying
levels of protection to safeguard participants' investment rights
under qualified pension plans holding employer stock. In the
meantime, the Enron participants have become unsecured
creditors with respect to their ERISA fiduciary breach cases filed
after Enron's bankruptcy. As unsecured creditors, their relief will
be limited to the small pool of remaining company assets. While
media attention that has spotlighted the excessive compensation
payments and the withdrawals from deferred compensation plans
made to Enron executives a year in advance of the company's
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy courts will have to attach such assets,
if still available, as voidable conveyances for the benefit of Enron's
creditors. Such process could take years to accomplish and thus
may not yield much for the Enron participants. The net result of
the media attention has been to highlight for the public the
various compensation schemes afforded to Enron executives, both
in the form of current compensation, as well as deferred
compensation. Only one of Congress' legislative proposal addresses
executive deferred compensation plans.
In response to the allegations made regarding premature
withdrawals made from Enron's executive deferred compensation
plans, the Chairman's Mark proposal takes a conservative
approach by lifting the moratorium on the Internal Revenue
Service regarding constructive receipt rulings. The Service would
be able to issue guidance regarding the use of haircut provisions
within executive compensation plans and innovative uses of
various trust arrangements that attempt to "secure" such plans.
Such guidance is certainly needed as the legislative moratorium
has resulted in a lack of regulatory guidance and the growth in
abuses of the features of executive compensation plans. This
proposal also affirms the underlying theme of ERISA and the Code
of reserving to the employer the power to decide compensation
issues, including how much of a benefit/deferral should be
extended to a participant and the timing of paying of such
benefits/deferrals.
The author affirms the limiting scope of the Chairman Mark's
legislative proposals regarding executive compensation plans. If
enacted, the Service could certainly formulate rules to impose
more significant limitations on those executives who were
controlling shareholders and/or insiders as they can be presumed
to have greater control over the exercise of such limitations. As the
tax rules were originally formulated on the premise that the

The John Marshall Law Review

[35:487

executive is not in control of certain triggering events that could
result in payment or acceleration of deferred compensation,
certainly revision of those rules should now be formulated, given
the realities of the Enron plans.
Any other type of legislative proposal that attempts to use the
tax code to make wide sweeping changes relating to employers'
corporate compensation decisions would be ill-advised. The
fluctuating changes in the maximum dollar limitations imposed on
qualified retirement and profit sharing plans have only resulted in
less deferrals under those plans and have not curtailed the use of
nonqualified excess benefit plans which supplement retirement,
benefits for executives who are unable to attain the full amount
under the qualified plan. Nor has the imposition of excise taxes on
excessive compensation payments in the context of golden
parachute arrangements deterred their use.
Corporate greed needs to be flushed out at the level of the
shareholders and public at large. Greater disclosure requirements
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and/or under the
corporate governance rules applicable at the various stock
exchanges for publicly held businesses would result in a greater
immediate impact on the ethical practices of governing boards of
directors, than reactive changes under the federal tax code. One
suggestion recommends the use of a compensation committee
composed of independent directors to approve all executive
deferred compensation plans, thereby assuring that a "neutral" set
of eyes has reviewed such plans. °2 Such a proposal has a greater
likelihood of success in exposing excessive compensation schemes
to the public than using the tax code to police such schemes.

202. See NYSE Comment Letter: Accounting and Listing Standards
Committee Proposal from Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc., to Ms. Janice O'Neill,

The New York Stock Exchange (June 27, 2002),
http//www.fwcook.com/pubdate.html
(advocating
various

plans at
governance

proposals to curb abuses under executive compensation plans). (Last visited

July 12, 2002).

